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INTRODUCTION
Initially, federal legislation respected the established jurisdiction of
states over their electricity industries, but those bright-line boundaries
have long faded. Congress first asserted its authority over electricity for
the purpose of regulating interstate transactions, which were beyond the
jurisdictional limits of state commissions. Federal authorities were mostly
distinct from the traditional functions of states. However, over the past
four decades, Congress and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
have moved further into the regulatory spaces once reserved for the states
in attempt to unify state policies around national goals. Despite repeated
federal efforts, state legislation and regulatory choices continue to push
the electricity industries of the various states along vastly different paths.
In Part I, this paper examines the history of electricity regulation with a
focus on the jurisdictional limits of state and federal powers. Part I
highlights Congressional grants of new authority to federal agencies as
well as assertions of major authority by federal regulators. Part I
concludes with an overview of state-by-state electricity industries with a
focus on key areas of distinction.
Part II explores national reforms to transmission siting and "clean
electricity" generation in light of the history examined in Part I. It
concludes that if Congress does pass new legislation in these areas it
should appreciate the range of legal and regulatory histories and
preferences at the state level. Rather than usurping state authority and
imposing nationwide regulatory programs, Congress should follow its own
precedent by respecting the decision making authority of states and
spurring reform at the state level. Given the complexity of an industry that
varies widely around the country, states may be in the best position to
allocate the local costs of meeting national goals. Motivating states to
reform and granting them flexibility will allow for a variety of regulatory
approaches and allow states to develop policies that match their current
situations and long-term priorities. Such policy diversity will enable
innovation and dampen the effects of mistakes and market failures.
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PART I: PRIMER IN ELECTRICITY POLICY HISTORY - THE EXPANDING ROLE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
A. The Establishment ofState Public Utility Commissions
Electricity regulation by states began in 1907 with the passage of
public utility laws in New York and Wisconsin. "[U]tility regulation as it
is known today dates from this legislation,"' as the basic elements of these
1907 laws were replicated around the country.
Technological innovation in electricity production in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries enabled industry consolidation, which led to
geographic monopolies, thus creating a rationale for robust government
regulation. Although Thomas Edison, who was granted the first electric
franchise,2 is credited with creating the electricity industry, its modem day
structure was established by his one-time secretary, Samuel Insull.
Edison's early generators were only capable of transmitting electricity a
few city blocks; therefore his business model relied on small scale and
decentralized power plants. 3 Only a few years after the opening of
Edison's first generator in New York, new technologies, alternating
current ("AC") transformers and steam turbines allowed for the generation
of larger amounts of electricity that could be transmitted around an entire
city.4 Insull exploited these new technologies and aggressively bought out
rival electricity providers who were building duplicative power plants and
wiring systems in the hopes of serving the same customers.' By 1907,
Insull had control of electricity supply in Chicago. 6
Chicago and other municipalities around the country had purposely
handed out duplicative franchises in the hope that competition in the
'Richard F. Hirsh, Power Loss: The Origins of Deregulation and Restructuring in the
American Electric Utility System 23 (1999) (quoting Ben W. Lewis, Public Utilities, in
Leverett S. Lyon & Victor Abramson, Government and Economic Life: Development
and Current Issues of American Public Policy 638 (1940)).
2 Robert L. Swartwout, Current Utility Regulatory Practice from a Historical
Perspective, 32 Nat. Resources J. 289, 299 (1992).
3 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 14.
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market would protect the public interest.7 However, observers at the time
concluded that regulation via competition in the nascent electricity
industry was futile because competition inevitably led to consolidation and
any brief period of competition brought about by duplicative franchises
was chaotic and destructive.8 Critics of municipal regulation of electric
utilities were wary of local officials, who were seen as corrupt, untrained,
underfinanced and outmatched by the increasingly powerful utilities.9
State regulation, which handed control to a small group of technocrats,
was seen as administratively superior to municipal control and matched
the progressive ideology of the time.' 0
The groundwork and rationale for robust regulation of monopoly
utilities by states had already been well established. By the turn of the
twentieth century most states had regulatory commissions, but they were
weak and their jurisdiction was generally limited to railroads.' The
Supreme Court had previously set out the criteria for public regulation of
private property. In Munn v. Illinois, the court determined that regulation
of private property was permissible "when such regulation becomes
necessary for the public good."' 2 Elaborating, the Court wrote that when
"one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he,
in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has thus created."13 In Smyth v. Ames, the Supreme Court held that a
company regulated by the state is entitled to "a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience."l 4
7 Swartwout, supra note 2, at 299.
8 Gregg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21
J.L. & Econ. 269, 274 (1978).
9 Id.; see also William L. Crow, Legislative Control ofPublic Utilities in Wisconsin, 18
Marq. L. Rev. 80, 83-85 (1934), available at
http://epublications.marquette.edu/mulr/voll 8/iss2/2 (listing reasons given by the
Wisconsin Railroad Commission in 1925 in favor of state control and against local
control, including: local bodies lack accounting expertise, local control is dominated by
local concerns and is likely to be biased, and local control would be too costly).
10 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 18.
" Swartwout, supra note 2, at 300.
12 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876).
" Id. at 126.
14 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898).
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Wisconsin's 1907 public utility law was premised on the Supreme
Court's decision in Smyth v. Ames and made two key additions to existing
regulatory practices: full rate regulation based on a valuation of the
utility's physical property that is "actually used" for the convenience of
the public and the grant of "indeterminate" operating permits to utilities.
While New York's 1907 law only allowed the commission to regulate the
maximum rates charged by the utility, Wisconsin required the commission
set the exact rates. 15 Rates could not be "unjust, unreasonable,
discriminatory, or preferential."' 6 Rates were to be based on the valuation
of property "actually used and useful for the convenience of the public" as
opposed to ratemaking based on the market value of the firm's stock as
New York's law mandated.' 7
Under the Wisconsin law, each utility was granted an
"indeterminate" permit that guaranteed the privilege of continuing
business without competition as long as the utility furnished adequate
service at reasonable rates.' 8 It also granted municipalities the option to
purchase the utility's property located in that municipality for just
compensation.19 The indeterminate permit allowed utilities to more easily
raise capital because investors were assured that the franchise would not
expire. The threat of municipal takeover was intended to goad the utility
into providing adequate service. 20
In a 1912 decision holding that a municipality was not allowed to
operate a lighting plant in a city where a private utility held an
indeterminate permit to provide electric service, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court elaborated on the new regulatory structure. The court first observed
that the 1907 law was "a most consummate effort of legislative wisdom
and a model for similar efforts elsewhere."21 It then held that the
dominant feature of the utility's franchise is not only that it is "perpetual,
subject to the conditions and limitations of the law,--indeterminate as it is
George B. Hudnall, The Public Service Commission Law of Wisconsin, Proc. Am. Pol.
Sci. Ass'n, Vol. 4, Fourth Annual Meeting 316, 320 (1907).6 Id. at 319-20.
Hirsh, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 1797m-5 (1917)).
Hudnall, supra note 15, at 321-22.
9 Id.
2o Hirsh, supra note 1, at 22.
Calumet Serv. Co. v. City of Chilton, 135 N.W. 131, 136 (Wis. 1912).
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said,--but shall be subject to such conditions exclusively." 22 In other
words, regulation of the utility was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
commission and the municipality could not terminate the arrangement
based on factors not enumerated in the public utility law. The court
determined that the intention of the legislature was to completely abandon
the previous system of municipal utility franchises and harmonize them
by making them referable to a single standard, to wit, the public
utility law, and to an ultimate single control to wit, control by the
trained impartial State Commission, so as to effect the one
supreme purpose, i.e., "the best service practicable at reasonable
cost to consumers in all cases and as near a uniform rate for service
as varying circumstances and conditions would permit."23
The law provided the commission with sweeping powers. Citing
the law, the court wrote that the commission "is vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state and
to do all things necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power
and jurisdiction," and then observed that "there is administrative authorit
to the limit, including quasi legislative as well as quasi judicial power."
With regard to the object of the law, the court quoted from the law,
"[e]very public utility is required to furnish reasonably adequate service
and facilities. The charge made by any public utility ... shall be
reasonable and just, and every unjust or unreasonable charge for such
service is prohibited and declared unlawful." 25
To summarize, the 1907 Wisconsin public utility law gave the state
commission exclusive jurisdiction over public utilities. The commission
had sweeping administrative authority that included rate-setting powers, as
well as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Utilities were granted
a perpetual geographic monopoly in return for furnishing adequate service.
The main goal of the law was to provide the best possible service to
customers at a reasonable rate. This "regulatory compact" was a tradeoff
22 Id. at 140.23 Id. at 142.
24 Id. at 143.
25 d
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for all parties. Utilities were subjected to wide-ranging regulation by the
state commission and in return received a grant of a monopoly franchise.
Customers gave up the right to choose a supplier for the assurance that
government would guarantee a reasonable price.26 The relationships
between regulators, investors, managers and customers required a
"sensitive balance" under the "long-standing and common sense standards
of justness and reasonableness." 27
By 1920, nearly every state had established a public utility
commission with jurisdiction over electricity, and the Wisconsin law was
the statute most often used as the model.28 In 1907 John Commons, an
economics professor and one of the architects of the Wisconsin law,29
predicted that the newly empowered commission would have unparalleled
influence:
Every public utility in the State, except streets, highways, and
bridges, is brought within its jurisdiction. It becomes also a local
government board, for it regulates towns, villages, and cities in
their management of these undertakings. Its authority is great and
far-reaching. It employs experts and agents .... It enters into the
daily life of the people more than all other agencies of government
combined. This will become more evident as time goes on, for
under its control is placed the development of the enormous water
power of Wisconsin, which eventually, through electricity, will
light the streets and houses and furnish motive power to operate
railways, factories, and possibly farms. 30
B. The Growth ofElectricity and the Emergence ofFederal Jurisdiction
The electricity industry prospered during the first few decades of
the twentieth century. From 1901 to 1932, electric utility generation grew
26 Swartwout, supra note 2, at 313.27 d
281 d. at 301.
2 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 21.
30 John R. Commons, The Wisconsin Public-Utilities Law, Am. Rev. Reviews: An Int'l
Mag. 221, 224 (Albert Shaw ed., 1907).
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at annual average rates of about 12% a year. 31 Technological
improvements led to increased productivity and cheaper prices. In 1905,
Insull's largest generator was five megawatts ("MW"), but by 1929 he had
installed a 208 MW generator, the largest in the world at the time.32
Efficiency of power plants also increased, from 4% of thermal energy
converted to electricity at the turn of the century to almost 20% by 1930.33
These improved efficiencies and economies of scale led to dramatically
lower prices for consumers. In 1900, the price per kilowatt-hour was
approximately three dollars (adjusted), but by 1930 the price had fallen by
about 80%.34
From its earliest days, the electricity industry was vertically
integrated, with a single company producing, transmitting and distributing
electricity to end users and performing essential system maintenance
functions. 35 The state-backed guarantee of a perpetual, geographic
monopoly reduced the nature of financial risk for electric utilities, which
enabled firms to use their financial and technological muscle to expand.36
The electricity industry was capital intensive,37 and growth was financed
by sales of common stock and bonds. 38 "Frequently, firms were
assembled into holding companies that could be controlled by rather small
percentages of stock."' The emergence of the holding company not only
brought large amounts of capital to the industry but also allowed smaller
firms to benefit from centralized management and engineering expertise
that they could not have afforded on their own.40 However, the financial
collapse of the 1930s brought the holding company structure under stress
31 U.S. Energy Infor. Admin., History of the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 1882-1991
(2001), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/electric-kid/append-a.html
[hereinafter EIA History].
32 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 46.
" Id. at 57.
34 Id. at 49.
3 Sally Hunt, Making Competition Work in Electricity 24 (2002).
36 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 34.
37 Id.
38 Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn, Competition and Institutional Change in U.S.
Electric Power Regulation, in International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation 172,
182 (Richard J. Gilbert & Edward P. Kahn, eds., 1996).
39 Id.
40 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 35.
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and provided one rationale for Congressional involvement in the
regulation of the electricity industry.
Federal involvement in the electricity industry actually began
nearly a decade before the financial collapse. The Federal Water Power
Act of 192041 created the Federal Power Commission ("FPC"), which
would later become the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
("FERC"). The Act granted the FPC jurisdiction over the siting,
construction and maintenance of hydroelectric dams on navigable waters.
The Act also gave the Commission backstop authority to regulate rates
and other matters related to electricity generated by the federally licensed
hydroelectric dams if the relevant state had not established a public utility
commission with appropriate jurisdiction.42
After the 1920 Act, electricity regulation still remained almost
exclusively the purview of the states with the exception of
hydroelectricity. However, gaps in the regulatory scheme began to
emerge. First, holding companies were expanding into multiple states and
were thus beyond the reach of a single state's agency.43 The financial
collapse of the 1930s ultimately provoked Congressional action. The
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 ("PUHCA")" charged the
Securities and Exchange Commission with regulating utility holding
companies and eliminating their financial abuses. Holding companies
41 Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 30, 41 Stat. 1077 (1920) (current version at 16
U.S.C. § 791 (2006)).
42 Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, § 19, 41 Stat. 1077, 1083 (1920) (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 812 (2006)).
43 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: 1935-1992,
1, 6-7 (Jan. 1993), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/FTPROOT/electricity/0563.pdf
[hereinafter PUHCA Analysis] ("In 1924, 74.6% of all electricity generated in the United
States was produced by operating companies which were parts of holding companies; by
1930, 90% of all operating companies were controlled by 19 holding companies ... It
was this high level of concentration and control, as well as the collapse of the utility
holding companies and the poor performance of the operating companies during the
Great Depression, which ultimately led to demands for their regulation .. . Since the
holding companies controlled the operating companies and the holding companies were
engaged in interstate commerce, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the State public
utility commissions to effectively regulate the operating utilities because of federal
reemption.").
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, § 33, 49 Stat. 838 (1935)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 79) (repealed 2005)).
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were required to limit their assets to those that "are physically
interconnected or capable of physical interconnection."45 The effect of
this provision, according to an analysis by the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, was to "confine utility holding companies to generally
operating within only one State where the7 could be effectively controlled
by that State's public utility commission."
A second gap in the regulatory scheme emerged after the Supreme
Court's decision in Public Utilities Commission Of Rhode Island v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.47 The case involved a corporation that
generated electricity in Rhode Island and sold it across the state border to
a customer in Massachusetts. The Massachusetts customer appealed a rate
increase, which had been approved by the Rhode Island Public Utility
Commission, to the Rhode Island Supreme Court claiming that the Rhode
Island Commission had no jurisdiction over an interstate sale. The United
States Supreme Court held that because the Rhode Island Commission's
order was "the imposition of a direct burden upon interstate commerce,
from which the state is restrained by the force of the commerce clause, it
must necessarily fall, regardless of its purpose.'4 8 The Court concluded
that neither state had the power to regulate such an interstate transaction
and "if such regulation is required it can only be attained by the exercise
of the power vested in Congress.' 4 9
With interstate sales of electricity beyond the reach of state
commissions, Congress added a new part to the Federal Water Power Act
titled "Regulation of Electric Utility Companies Engaged in Interstate
Commerce."50 The FPC was given broad jurisdiction over "transmission
of electric energy in interstate commerce and ... the sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce" and over "all facilities for
4 51d. § 36, 49 Stat. 838 (current version 15 U.S.C. § 79(b)(29)(A) (repealed 2005)).46 PUHCA Analysis, supra note 43, at 11.
47 273 U.S. 83 (1927). This gap was later termed the "Attleboro Gap" by the Supreme
Court in New York v. FERC. 535 U.S. 1, 11 (2002) (see infra, text accompanying note
150).
48 Attleboro, 273 U.S. at 89 (citing Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 199
(1925); Real Silk Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325, 336 (1925)).
49 Id. at 90.
so Federal Power Act, ch. 687, § 213, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §
824 (2006)).
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such transmission or sale of electric energy."5' The Act granted the FPC a
range of new powers, including the authority to order utilities to
52interconnect and prescribe the terms of that interconnection, to regulate
and set rates for transmission or sale of electricity across state lines, 53 to
hold hearings about rates and services, 54 and to compel utilities to file
reports about costs of inventory.5 5 Utilities were prohibited from selling
any property subject to FPC jurisdiction without FPC approval 56 and could
not issue securities without approval. Sections 205 and 206, which
would provide the justification for a vast expansion of the Commission's
authority sixty years later, required that utilities charge "just and
reasonable rates," prohibited utilities from granting any "undue prejudice
or disadvantage," and granted the FPC the authority to remedy "unduly
discriminatory or preferential" practices. Congress also added a third part
to the Act, which required all public utilities under the jurisdiction of the
FPC to keep records in accordance with rules promulgated by the FPC,58
granted the FPC further investigatory powers, 59 allowed the FPC to set
depreciation rates,60 and forbade anyone from serving as an officer for
more than one public utility.61
While Congress granted wide-ranging authority to the FPC, it was
explicitly the intent of Congress not to supersede the jurisdiction of state
commissions. The Act, now titled simply the Federal Power Act ("FPA"),
declared that federal regulation should "extend only to those matters
which are not subject to regulation by the States." 62 Furthermore, the
provisions of the Act applied only to interstate commerce and "the
Commission ... shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically
provided in this [Part] . . . over facilities used for the generation of electric
s' Id. § 201(b), 49 Stat. 847 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006)).52 1d. § 202(b), 49 Stat. 848 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (2006)).
3Id. §§ 205(a), 206(a), 49 Stat. 851-52 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2006)).
54Id. §§ 205(e), 207, 49 Stat. 852-53 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2006)).
"Id. § 208(b), 49 Stat. 853 (16 U.S.C. § 824g(b) (2006)).
6Id. 212, 49 Stat. 849 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)).
1Id. § 213, 49 Stat. 850 (1935) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2006)).
s8 Id. § 213, 49 Stat. 855 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 825c(a) (2006)).
9Id. § 213, 49 Stat. 856 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 825f(a) (2006)).6o Id § 213, 49 Stat. 855 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 825a(a) (2006)).6 1 Id § 213,49 Stat. 856 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 825d(b) (2006)).
62 Id. § 201(a), 49 Stat. 847 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006)).
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energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the
transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce . . . ."6 3
In 1943, the Supreme Court wrote "[t]he primary purpose of Title
II, Part II of the 1935 amendments to the Federal Power Act . .. was to
give a federal agency power to regulate the sale of electric energy across
state lines,"64 giving authority to the states that had previously been denied
by the Supreme Court's 1927 decision in PUC ofRI v. Attleboro Steam.
Two years later, the Supreme Court looked at the legislative history and
cited the commissioner of the FPC who said the " new Title II of the act is
designed to secure coordination on a regional scale of the Nation's power
resources and to fill the gap in the present State regulation of electric
utilities. It is conceived entirely as a supplement to, and not as a
substitution for, State regulation." 66 A House Committee report on the bill
declared that "[t]he new parts are so drawn as to be a complement to and
in no sense a usurpation of State regulatory authority and contain
throughout directions to the Federal Power Commission to receive and
consider the views of State commissions."67
Despite the purpose of the Act and its legislative history, the
Supreme Court also held that sections of the Act pertaining to the sale of
utility property and securities, issuance of securities, investigation into
actual costs of utility property and accounting standards explicitly ant
overlapping jurisdiction for utilities that fall under FPC jurisdiction. 8 In
other words, the FPC and a relevant state commission both have oversight
responsibilities with regard to the same subject matter. In one case, the
Court held that a sale of securities required FPC approval even though the
state commission was also required to approve the sale. 69
With the passage of the FPA, regulation of electric utilities was
generally neatly divided between state commissions and the FPC. The
61 Id. § 201(b), 49 Stat. 847 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 825(b)(1) (2006)).
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Power Conun'n, 319 U.S. 61, 67 (1943).
65 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
66 Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Conun'n, 324 U.S. 515, 525 (1945) (quoting
Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th
Cong. 384 (1935)).
67 Id. at 526 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1318, at 7 (1935)).
68 Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 319 U.S. at 75.
69 id.
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SEC was given authority to break up large holding companies, which had
the effect of relegating most utilities to a single state. State commissions
were the primary administrators of the "regulatory compact" between
utilities, customers and investors, and had broad authority to regulate
nearly all aspects of a utility's business, including setting rates for all
intrastate sales and approving the siting of new facilities.70 Interstate rates
fell under the jurisdiction of the FPC, and certain financial matters could
be subject to both state and federal jurisdiction. Congress did not expand
the FPC's jurisdiction with regard to electricity regulation until 1978.
However, other federal agencies emerged as key players in the
electricity industry. New Deal Programs7 established agencies such as
the Rural Electrification Administration and the Tennessee Valley
Authority which expanded the federal government's role in electricity
generation, transmission and distribution. By 1950, 12% of all electricity
was generated by the federal government.72 The Atomic Energy Act of
195413 created the civilian nuclear power industry and gave authority to
the Atomic Energy Commission to issue licenses for nuclear facilities.74
The Clean Air Act, passed in 196375 and significantly amended in 1970,
197 7,7 and 1990,78 required the Environmental Protection Agency and
states to control pollution from electricity generation. The new federal
agencies did not alter state commissions' role as the primary regulators of
electric utilities, nor did they change the commissions' primary mission,
7o See Swartwout, supra note 2, at 305 (describing the state regulatory process as
primarily encompassing three elements: the certificate of convenience and necessity,
which a state commission had to issue to grant a utility permission to construct new
facilities, rate regulation, and the regulation of utility securities and finances).
71 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (2006); The Rural
Electrification Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 901 (2006); The Bonneville Project Act of 1937,
16 U.S.C. § 832 (2006).
72 EIA History, supra note 31.
7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2011 (2006)).
74 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006).
75 Clean Air Act, Pub L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
7401 (2006)).
76 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
n Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 676 (1977).78 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990).
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which dated back to the 1907 Wisconsin law, of providing reliable service
at the lowest possible rate. These new agencies introduced new goals and
concerns for the electricity industry. Nuclear safety and air pollution were
not relevant when state legislators created regulatory commissions in the
early part of the twentieth century, but they emerged as key issues in the
latter part of the century that state commissions would encounter on a
regular basis.
Meanwhile, electricity continued to expand. From 1932 to 1941
generation of electricity increased by an average of 8% per year while
retail prices fell by one-third. 79 After World War II, growth continued,
particularly in the residential sector, as prices continued to fall.8 0 From
1949 until 1981, total electricity generation in the United States went up
each year and increased nearly eightfold over the entire three decade
period.8 1 Electric utilities were fueled by an ideology of growth, and the
idea of slowing the industry's expansion was "nothing less than heresy to
the generations of public servants and businessmen who have come to
equate growth with progress, and energy demand with the vitality of our
society." 82
As electricity generation grew, so did interstate transmission. By
1970, the United States had twenty-one "power pools,"83 interconnected
networks of transmission lines that enabled coordination among
neighboring utilities. These voluntary arrangements between utilities
could include a variety of services, such as purchase and sale of reserve
generating capacity, purchase and sale of electricity during emergencies
and maintenance, seasonal exchange of low-cost energy and centralized
coordination of generation based on cost.84 Pooling could have significant
economic benefits for participating utilities, such as reduced investment in
reserve generation and coordinated planning that increases the efficiency
7 EIA History, supra note 31.
80 Id.
81 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review, Electricity Overview, 1949-2009
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.eia.gov/aer/elect.html.
82 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 50 (citation omitted).
83 James F. Fairman & John C. Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition in the
Electric Utility Industry, 28 Hastings L.J. 1159, 1170 (1977).84 Id. at 1169.
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of new investments." Section 202(a) of the FPA loosely encouraged such
arrangements,86 and power pool agreements were submitted to the FPC for
87its approval.
Voluntary pooling agreements were supplemented by the
establishment of the National Electric Reliability Council and nine
regional reliability councils by 1968.8 The FPC issued an order in 1970
requiring that state utility commissions and the FPC be allowed to
participate in reliability council meetings.89 An FPC report from 1970
noted that "the enormous development of interstate power networks in the
last thirty years requires a reevaluation of the governmental responsibility
for continuity of the service supplied by them, since it is impossible for a
single state effectively to regulate the service from an interstate pool or
grid. 90
C. Congress Sets National Electricity Policy Goals
After forty-three years without any electricity legislation from
Congress, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") 91
ushered in a wave of legislation and regulation, both at the federal and
state levels, that has reshaped the industry and vastly expanded federal
authority. Following the Oil Embargo of 1973, PURPA introduced two
new goals into electricity regulation: conservation and the development of
more efficient, smaller scale, non-utility generation.
85 id.
86 "[T]he Commission is empowered and directed to divide the country into regional
districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the generation,
transmission, and sale of electric energy ... It shall be the duty of the Commission to
promote and encourage such interconnection and coordination . . . ." Federal Power Act,§202(a) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a (2006)).
8 Fairman & Scott, supra note 83, at 1178.
8 George K. Lagassa, State Utility Commissions as Vestigial Organs: The Need for
Regional Governance ofElectric Utilities, 28 U. Kan. L. Rev. 291, 296 (1979).
"Id. at 298.
90 Id. at 297 (quoting U.S. Fed. Power Comm'n, Report to President on The Power
Failure in the Northeastern United States and the Province of Ontario on Nov. 9-10
(1965), available at http://blackout.gmu.edu/archive/pdf/fc 65.pdf.)
9 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 91 Stat. 3117
(1978) [hereinafter PURPA] (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (2006)).
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Title I of PURPA 92 required each state public utility commission to
consider implementing a number of federal ratemaking standards with the
purpose of encouraging conservation, efficient use of utility resources and
equitable rates93 . The Act Xermitted state commissions to reject the
federal ratemaking standards4 after first holding a formal hearing and
making determinations about each federal standard in writing.95 The Act
authorized the Department of Energy ("DOE") to provide grants to state
commissions that could be used to make determinations about the federal
ratemaking standards. 96
Title II of PURPA "ended the monopoly control enjoyed by
regulated utilities" 97 by opening the electricity generation market to non-
utility owned cogeneration facilities 98 and small power production
92 PURPA, §111, 91 Stat. 3117, 3121 (1978) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2611-13
(2006)).
93 PURPA, §101 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 2611) ("The purposes of this title are to
encourage - (1) conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities; (2) the optimization
of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources by electric utilities; and (3) equitable
rates to electric consumers."). The Conference Committee Report explained that the first
purpose was to foster conservation by end users, and the second purpose was directed at
utilities and the efficiencies of their facilities, including capital resources. Nat'l Ass'n of
Regulatory Comm'rs, Reference Manual and Procedures for Implementation of the
PURPA Standards in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 14 (Mar. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.naruc.org/Publications/PURPA Manual webversion.pdf.
94 PURPA, § 111(a) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 2621) ("Nothing in this subsection
prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated electric utility from making any
determination that it is not appropriate to implement any such standard, pursuant to its
authority under otherwise applicable State law.").
9 PURPA, § 111(b) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 2621) ("The consideration referred to
in subsection (a) shall be made after public notice and hearing. The determination in
subsection (a) shall be (A) in writing, (B) based upon findings included in such
determination and upon evidence presented at the hearing, and (C) available to the
rublic.").PURPA, § 207 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 2645).
9 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 73.
98 PURPA, § 201(18) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 796(18)) ("A cogeneration facility
means a facility which produces - (i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful
energy (such as heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling
purposes.").
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facilities. 99 PURPA amended the FPA to require utilities to purchase
electricity to generated by qualifying cogeneration and small power
production facilities ("Qualifying Facilities"). The Act required the FPC,
now named FERC, to promulgate rules to encourage sales of electricity to
utilities and ensure that rates are "just and reasonable to the electric
consumers of the electric utility and in the public interest."10 FERC was
also authorized, in consultation with state commissions, to exempt
Qualifying Facilities from provisions of the FPA, PUHCA and state
laws. 102 Title II also affected the FERC's regulation of interstate
electricity transactions. Prior to PURPA, interstate electricity transactions
were regulated under the FPA based on the seller's costs using a similar
methodology that state commissions used in ratemaking proceedings.
Under PURPA, FERC could approve wholesale transactions involving
Qualifying Facilities based on competitive bidding and market rates rather
than cost. 03
Title II of PURPA further amended the FPA to grant FERC the
authority to order a utility to connect a generator to the utility's
PURPA, § 201(17) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)) ("Small power production
facility means a facility which - (i) produces electric energy solely by the use, as a
primary energy source, of biomass, waste, renewable resources, or any combination
thereof; and (ii) has a power production capacity which, together with any other facilities
located at the same site (as determined by the Commission) is not greater than 80
megawatts.")
100 "[T]he Commission shall prescribe ... such rules as it determines necessary to
encourage cogeneration and small power production which rules require electric utilities
to offer to - (1) sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration facilities and qualifying
small power production facilities and (2) purchase electric energy from such facilities."
PURPA, § 210 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)).
1o' PURPA, § 210(b) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)).
102 PURPA, § 2 10(e) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)).
103 Larry Parker, CRS Report for Congress, Electricity Restructuring: Comparison of
S.1401, H.R. 655, H.R. 1230, S.722, and H.R. 1960 (1997), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97-504_19971117.pdf; see also Jeffrey D. Watkiss and
Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992 - A Watershedfor Competition in the
Wholesale Power Market, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 447, 486 (1993) (noting that "FERC has
permitted power wholesales at market-based rates only where FERC has determined that
the seller - electric utilities as well as non-utility generators - either lacked power to
influence price in the relevant market or had mitigated that power in some fashion.").
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transmission system,104 to require a utility to provide transmission services
to another utility (also known as wheeling) and to exempt utilities from
state laws that prohibited or prevented utilities from entering into
voluntary power pool agreements.os These new powers were subject to a
range of caveats. FERC could not wield its new powers unilaterally but
could only act in response to an application from an affected party. With
regard to its authority to order a connection or transmission service
(wheeling), FERC's authority was limited by a number of constraints' 06
including determinations by FERC that such an order would be in the
public interest, would conserve energy or improve reliability and would
maintain existing competitive relationships.' 07
In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Title I, which required state commissions to make a
determination about federal ratemaking standards, and Section 210, which
required utilities to purchase electricity from Qualifying Facilities.'0o The
District Court had held these sections of the Act unconstitutional because
they exceeded Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and Tenth
Amendment. With regard to the Commerce Clause, the appellees asserted
that "PURPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not regulate
'commerce'; instead, it is said, the Act directs the non-consenting State to
regulate in accordance with federal procedures."109 The Court held that
104 PURPA, §203, 91 Stat. 3117, 3135 (1978).
'os Id. § 205.
106 "No order may be issued . . . unless the Commission determines that such order is not
likely to result in a reasonable ascertainable economic loss ... will not place an undue
burden on an electric utility .. . will not unreasonably impair the reliability of an electric
utility ... will not impair the ability of any electric utility ... to render adequate service
to its customers .. .unless the applicant demonstrates that he is ready, willing, and able to
reimburse the party subject to the order ..... Id. § 204; see also id. § 203 ("No order
may be issued under subsection (a) unless the Commission determines that such order
would reasonably preserve existing competitive relationships.").
107 "No order may be issued by the Commission under subsection (a) unless the
Commission determines that such order - (1) is in the public interest, (2) would (A)
encourage overall conservation of energy or capital, (B) optimize the efficiency of use of
facilities and resources, or (C) improve the reliability of any electric utility system or
federal power marketing agency to which the order applies .. ." Id. § 202(c).
108 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 (1982).
19Id. at 743.
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electricity generation and transmission have an immediate effect on
interstate commerce, and it was therefore within Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause to enact both Title I and Section 210.
Regarding the Tenth Amendment challenge, the Court wrote that
"[i]nsofar as § 210 authorizes FERC to exempt qualified power facilities
from 'State laws and regulations,' it does nothing more than pre-empt
conflicting state enactments in the traditional way."110 Furthermore, "the
Federal Government may displace state regulation even though this serves
to 'curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make leislative choices
respecting subjects the States may consider important."" 1 According to
the Court, PURPA "establishes a program of cooperative federalism that
allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards,
to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet
their own particular needs."1 2 The Court concluded that Title I "simply
establishes requirements for continued state activity in an otherwise pre-
emptible field.""13
PURPA was landmark legislation because it marked the federal
government's first major step into the regulation of intrastate electricit
sales. The Act mandated that all state commissions "consider," ,
Congress' ratemaking standards in light of the national goals of
conservation, efficiency and equity.115 One plausible explanation for
Congress entering the field of intrastate ratemaking was to unify the "wide
diversity and unevenness in public policy that characterized ninety years
of state public utility commission regulation."ll6 However, Congress'
attempt to harmonize state policies to meet national goals was, in many
cases, "unnecessary and dated in that many state commissions were 'well
110 Id.
11 Id. at 759 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface and Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
290 (1981)).
112 Id. at 767 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 289).
1 
" Id. at 769.
114 "(a) Consideration and Determination. 
- Each state regulatory authority .. . shall
consider each standard established by subsection (d) and make a determination
concerning whether or not it is appropriate to implement such standard to carry out the
urposes of this title." PURPA, §111, 91 Stat. 3117, 3121 (1978).15 PURPA §101, supra note 93.
116 Douglas N. Jones, The National Energy Act and State Commission Regulation. 30
Case Wes. L. Rev. 324, 336 (1979).
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ahead' in employing the concepts and practices proposed" in PURPA.I
PURPA nonetheless had an effect on laggard states. According to a DOE
survey of state commissions, PURPA's ratemaking standards were
adopted or implemented by most state commissions that had not already
done so.' 8 The effect of PURPA's Title I, at the very least, was to put
state commissions on notice that Congress sought to achieve national
goals through ratemaking and further failure by laggard state commissions
to meet those goals could result in increased intervention by FERC and
Congress.
Title II, which required utilities to purchase electricity from
Qualifying Facilities, provided for a more intrusive intervention by the
federal government into intrastate electricity markets." 9 Section 210
created new market players that could be exempted from state laws by
FERC and dictated that Qualifying Facilities receive "relatively high"' 0
117 Id. Jones further notes that:
[T]hose state public utility commissions least wary of NEA [National Energy Act, of
which PURPA was a component] are those that have been most progressive in
consideration of many of the standards and guidelines that appear in the legislation.
Compliance could be fairly simple for about seventeen state commissions which have
already held 'generic hearings,' almost all of which encompassed the ratemaking
standards in NEA ... Further, a number of commissions which had generic (or other)
proceedings underway but not finished on the date of the enactment of NEA have wisely
taken advantage of the PURPA provision which allows commissions to incorporate
consideration of the standards in the course of completing such hearings. Id. at 338.
118 Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, Reference Manual and Procedures for
Implementation of the "PURPA Standards" in the Energy Independence and Security Act
of 2007, 26 (Aug. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.naruc.org/Publications/EISAStandardsManualFlNAL.pdf (citing Paul
Rodgers & Charles D. Gray, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, Second Report
on State Commission Progress Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
(Oct. 20, 1982). The survey defined "adopted" as a favorable finding by the commission.
Id. "Implemented" was defined as a favorable finding and the standard was actually put.
into effect. Id. Presumably adopted standards would ultimately be implemented, but the
survey was conducted in 1982, just over three years after PURPA became law. Id; see
also John T. Miller, Jr., Conscripting State Regulatory Authorities in a Federal Electric
Rate Regulatory Scheme: A Goal ofPURPA Partially Realized, 4 Energy L.J. 77, 82
(1983) (quoting the same study and noting that the federal ratemaking standards were
adopted at rates between 66% and 49%).
119 PUPRA, supra note 104.120 Hirsh, supra note 1, at 81.
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rates that would be subject to federal regulations. While Title I was
Congress' attempt to unify state-based ratemaking around national goals,
Title II created an entirely new market that was deemed to be in the
national interest and that states had largely ignored.121
The purpose of this new market, as an association of utilities
commented, was not to introduce competition for the sake of economic
efficiency, but to enable new entrants who would reduce the use of fossil
fuels in generation.122 By this metric, PURPA made a difference. While
5,822 MW of cogeneration, which uses fossil fuels more efficiently than
traditional generation, went online between 1970 and 1979, 17,551 MW of
cogeneration were added in the 1980s.123 Non-fossil fuel based generation
technologies flourished as well. During the 1980s, 1,100 MW of wind
capacity went online, compared to 17 MW in the 1970s; 1,523 MW of
wood-fueled power began operation in the 1980s compared to 212 MW in
the 1970s; and geothermal power increased from 550 MW installed during
the 1970s to 2,135 MW in the 1980s.124 Solar power, landfill gas and
municipal solid waste, which saw no installations in the 1970s, combined
to add more than 2,000 MW of capacity during the 1980s. 12 Although
there was more hydropower capacity added in the 1970s than in the 1980s,
PURPA's focus on small power production facilities enabled a clear trend
121 See Thomas Hagler, Utility Purchases ofDecentralized Power: The PURPA Scheme, 5
Stan. Envtl. L. Rev. 154, 159 (1983) (noting that a 1977 study found that state laws and
regulations did not extend to the issue of utility purchases of decentralized power. Most
public utility commissions, moreover, had no policy for alternative energy).
122 Richard D. Cudahy, PURPA: The Intersection of Competition and Regulatory Policy,
16 Energy L. J. 419, 423 (1995) (quoting the "PURPA Reform Petition," drafted by the
PURPA Reform Group, an association of utilities).
123 All statistics in this paragraph are from my analysis of U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
2009 Electric Generator Report, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia860.html [Hereinafter 2009 Generator
Report]. But see D. Eugene Simmons, Section 210 ofPURPA: Are Mid-Course
Corrections Needed? 2 Nat. Resources & Env't 25 (1986-1987) (Simmons argues that
many cogeneration facilities are inefficient and do not further the goals of PURPA.
Rather, "they occupy an artificial niche in the marketplace created solely by the legal
requirement that utilities must buy all power offered to them by qualifying facilities.").
See 2009 Generator Report, supra note 123.
125 See id
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toward smaller scale projects in the 1980s, with the average size of a new
project decreasing from 108 MW in the 1970s to 15 MW in the 1980s.126
These new installations were concentrated in a handful of states,
particularly California.127 PURPA led to a flurry of new state electricity
legislation and regulation, with much of it focused on non-utility owned
generation. Some states went above and beyond PURPA's requirements
for Qualifying Facilities,' 28 particularly in ratemaking, by mandating
highly preferential rates to Qualifying Facilities.129 Although Section 210
applied nationwide, its impact was contingent on state-by-state
implementation and results varied widely. Overall, utility generation
continued to dominate the market.' 30
D. Restructuring of the 1990s and the Growing Powers ofFERC
FERC believed that opening access to transmission lines for non-
utility generators was critical to encouraging the further development of
competitive markets for electricity generation.' 3 1 This proposition makes
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See Stanley A. Martin, Problems with PURPA: The Needfor State Legislation to
Encourage Cogeneration and Small Power Production, 11 B.C. Envtl Aff. L. Rev. 149,
171 n.194 (1983) (stating that at least seventeen states have enacted "mini-PURPAs" that
require state commissions to implement regulations for exemptions of Qualifying
Facilities, for determining rates for Qualifying Facilities, and for requiring utilities to
interconnect).
129 See Cudahy, supra note 122, at 433 (In regard to state ratemaking, to calculate
avoided cost, New Jersey added 10% to the average PJM pool price. Nine states included
"societal and environmental costs" to varying degrees.); see also Hagler, supra note 121,
at 162 (Hagler notes the ways that state ratemaking varied. Oregon's commission, for
example, approved a rate for Qualifying Facilities based on residential prices. A
salesman of windmills commented that the rate, "made the difference between no sales
and the sales we've made.").
130 During the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, of all new generation capacity added, more than
60% was owned by utilities. In the 1990s, the percentage of new capacity that was utility
owned plummeted to 43%. 2009 Generator Report, supra note 123.
131 See Joseph T. Kelliher, Pushing the Envelope: Development ofFederal Electric
Transmission Access Policy, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 543, 606 n.15-16 (1992) (As examples,
the FERC wrote in one decision that its "fundamental competitive concern ... is that an
increase in control over key transmission facilities may lead to a greater ability to block
competing lower-cost suppliers from reaching wholesale electric customers." In another
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sense; if a generator is unable to connect to a utility's transmission system,
the generator will not be able to sell the electricity it is producing.
Vertically-integrated public utilities have a disincentive to connect
potential competitors. One solution, in the eyes of regulators, was to force
monopoly utilities to connect competing generators, thereby enabling
competition.
However, FERC's power to order a utility to open its transmission
lines to competitors was quite limited. In fact, because of the constraints
that PURPA placed on FERC's wheeling authority, FERC had never
exercised its authority under Section 211 of the FPA to order wheeling.132
Lacking the authority to order open access to transmission lines outright,
FERC imposed it as a condition of other orders that were within its power.
For example, FERC used its authority under the FPA to condition
approvals of mergers on a utility's acceptance of obligations to provide
transmission access to third parties. 133 FERC also conditioned
authorizations to sell power at market rates on a utility's agreement to file
transmission tariffs that would enable third party generators to access the
transmission system.' 3 4
decision the FERC wrote that "without a guarantee that wheeling service will be provided
on these occasions, it is unlikely that a competitive market for bulk power could
emerge.").
132 1d. at 551. Prior to the passage of PURPA, FERC had no wheeling authority. The
FPA had granted the FPC very limited power to order interconnection between an electric
utility and another entity producing electricity. The Supreme Court further limited that
authority in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), holding that the
FPA does not grant the Commission the authority to order wheeling, or the transfer of
power from one utility to another. Id. at 387 n.4. The Court looked at the legislative
history of the FPA and noted that an earlier draft of the Act included a common carrier
provision that "would have made it the duty of every public utility ... to transmit energy
for any person upon reasonable request" and would have also given the FPC the authority
to order wheeling if it found to be in the public interest. Id. at 384 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 387 n.4. The version of the FPA that Congress actually
passed "rejected a pervasive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution
of power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships." Id. at 374.
133 Kelliher, supra note 131, at 606 n.43 (listing five cases where FERC imposed
transmission obligations on merging utilities).
134 Id. at 564 (citing several FERC decisions). However, FERC's authority over market
rates was further limited because the Commission first had to make a finding of market
power by the applicant. See id. at 577 (noting that in one case at the FERC, the
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The PUHCA was a second impediment to increased development
of competitive markets for generation. PURPA exempted Qualifying
Facilities from PUHCA regulations1 35 and required utilities to purchase
electricity generated by Qualifying Facilities. 1 6 Although utilities were
forced to work with Qualifying Facilities, they could continue to refuse to
deal with non-utility generators who did not meet PURPA's requirements
for achieving status as a Qualifying Facility. Non-Qualifying Facility,
non-utility generators were further limited by ownership restrictions
placed on them by the PUHCA which inhibited their ability to raise capital
and imposed costly regulatory burdens.137
Congress attempted to remedy both of these constraints to the
development of competitive generation markets with the passage of the
Energy Policy Act of 1992.138 The Act amended the PUHCA to include
the defined term "Exempt Wholesale Generator" ("EWG").139 EWG
status allowed a company to own a generation facility and sell wholesale
power without meeting PURPA's requirements for a Qualifying Facility
or being regulated under the PUHCA.140 EWGs were permitted to own
Qualifying Facilities, and certain utilities were allowed to own EWG
subsidiaries. As was the case with Qualifying Facilities, Congress was
again permitting a new entrant into electricity markets which would
directly affect intrastate transactions. The Act carved out minimal power
for state commissions to override a presumption against sales by EWGs to
Department of Justice intervened to request a rehearing on the basis that "the
Commission is simply without statutory authority to require open access as a quid-pro-
quo for its approval of lawful competitive market based rates" where the applicant lacked
market power).
13 PURPA, § 2 10(e) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)).136PURPA, § 210(a) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)).
137 Watkiss & Smith, supra note 103, at 465.
138 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
139 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 711 (a)(a) ("The term 'exempt
wholesale generator' means any person determined by person determined by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to be engaged directly, or indirectly through one or more
affiliates as defined in section 2(a)(l l)(B), and exclusively in the business of owning or
operating, or both owning and operating, all or part of one or more eligible facilities and
selling electric energy at wholesale.").
1401 Id. § 711(g).
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an affiliated utility,141 provided that the state commission make several
determinations about the transaction.142 But, in general, states had limited
authority over EWGs.
To enable EWGs and other generators to sell their power to
utilities, the 1992 Act also expanded FERC's authority over wheeling.
The amended provisions dropped PURPA's requirement that FERC make
a finding that a wheeling order would improve conservation or efficiency
or maintain the competitive positions of the parties. Under the 1992 Act,
FERC could issue a wheeling order based only on a finding that the order
was in the public interest. The amended wheeling provisions,143 however,
still limited FERC by allowing it to issue an order only upon an
application from another utility or another entity that generates
electricity.144 Furthermore, FERC was given only backstop authority; the
applicant had to first apply directly to the transmitting utility before
applying to FERC. 145 Overall, the amended provisions required FERC to
make fewer findings and imposed fewer limitations on FERC's authority
to order wheeling but still did not grant blanket authority that FERC would
need to open transmission access nationwide.
Lacking an explicit grant by Congress to require utilities to adopt
transmission tariffs of general applicability that would allow any generator
to access a utility's transmission system, FERC looked to the FPA to grant
itself the authority. Reinterpreting sections of the FPA left mostly
unchanged by Congress since 1935, FERC granted itself the authority to
require transmission owners to offer wheeling to any qualified, wholesale
generator. FERC Order 888, promulgated in 1996, requires:
141 "Affiliate" of a company is defined in the PUHCA as any person that directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 5% or more of the outstanding
voting securities of such specified company. 42 U.S.C. § 16451 (2006).
142 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §711(k)(2)(A)(ii), 722, 106 Stat.
2776, 2909 (1992) ("A determination that the transaction (I) will benefit consumers; (II)
does not violate any state law ... (III) would not provide the exempt wholesale generator
any unfair competitive advantage . .. and (IV) is in the public interest . ... ).
143 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§ 721, 722, 106 Stat. 2776, 2915
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all public utilities that own, operate or control interstate
transmission facilities to offer network and point-to-point
transmission services (and ancillary services) to all eligible buyers
and sellers in wholesale bulk power markets, and to take
transmission service for their own uses under the same rates, terms
and conditions offered to others. In other words, it requires non-
discriminatory (comparable) treatment for all eligible users of the
monopolists' transmission facilities. 14 6
Order 888 was intended to further competition in generation by
prohibiting "owners and operators of monopoly transmission facilities
from denying transmission access, or offering only inferior access, to other
power suppliers in order to favor the monopolists' own generation and
increase monopoly profits . ... "147 It required all transmission owners to
file an open access transmission tariff with FERC and to separately state
the price of wholesale generation and wholesale transmission (also known
as functional unbundling' 48 ). FERC also imposed an open access
requirement on retail transmission in interstate commerce where the state
commission or utility had voluntarily unbundled generation and
transmission.149 Critics of FERC's Order 888 claimed that by relying on
sections of the FPA that had not been significantly amended since their
enactment in 1935 FERC was ignoring both Congress' intent to merely fill
the Attleboro gap and the FPA provisions that specifically limited FERC's
wheeling authority. o Furthermore, FERC's claim of jurisdiction over
retail transmission crossed a jurisdictional bright line between state and
federal control.' 5 1
146 Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order 888: Promoting
Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 78 FERC 61,220 (1997) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[Hereinafter Order 888].
147 id.
148 New York v. FERC, 535 US 1, 11 (2002).
149 Order 888, supra note 146, at 121.
Iso New York v. FERC, 535 US 1, 20 (2002).
.Id. at 16.
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The Supreme Court upheld FERC's assertion of jurisdiction and
agreed with FERC that the FPA granted FERC authority over unbundled
transactions.152 The Court supported its holding with citations to sections
201, 205 and 206, which established FERC's jurisdiction as including "the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce," prohibited utilities
from charging unreasonable, discriminatory rates "with respect to any
transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission," and
gave the Commission the power to correct such unlawful practices.
Agreeing with the lower court,'5 3 the Court wrote that "the landscape of
the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when
the electricity universe was 'neatly divided into spheres of retail versus
wholesale sales,' and the plain language of the FPA readily supports
FERC's claim of jurisdiction." 54 The language of the statute'5 5 confines
FERC's jurisdiction over sales to wholesale sales, but the FPA ,ut no such
limitation over its jurisdiction over interstate transmission.15 Although
the Court acknowledged that the legislative history "demonstrates
Congress' interest [in 1935] in retaining state jurisdiction over retail
sales," the Court's evaluation of that history was "affected by the
importance of the changes in the electricity industry that have occurred
since the FPA was enacted."' 57 The Court concluded that the statutory
text provided the "clearest guidance," and the "text unquestionably
supports FERC's jurisdiction to order unbundling of wholesale
transactions . . . as well as to regulate the unbundled transmissions of
electricity retailers."
152 d
1 Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
154 New York v. FERC, 535 US 1, 16 (2002) (citing Transmission Access Policy Study
Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
155 "The provisions of this subchapter shall apply to the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate
comerce... ." 16 USC § 824(b)(1) (2006).
156New York v. FERC, 535 US 1, 17 (2002).
' Id. at 23.
Id.
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FERC released two other major orders to further take transmission
out of the hands of state commissions. Order 889,159 released on the same
day as Order 888, required every public utility that owns, controls, or
operates facilities used for interstate transmission to participate in or create
an electronic system that provides potential customers with real-time
information about transmission capacity, prices and other information. In
1999, FERC issued Order 2000 160 which established principles for
Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTO"), a third-party that manages
interstate transmission to ensure equal access and reliability. FERC's
objective was "for all transmission-owning entities in the Nation ... to
place their transmission facilities under the control of appropriate RTOs in
a timely manner,"1 61 but it maintained a voluntary approach. Utilities
were not required to join an RTO,162 but they had to at least report to the
FERC about impediments to RTO participation.163 FERC found that
RTOs were desirable because "traditional management of the transmission
grid by vertically integrated electric utilities was inadequate to
support ... the continued development of competitive electricity markets,
and that continued discrimination in the provision of transmission
services ... may also . be impeding fully competitive electricity
markets." 64 If RTOs were not formed voluntarily, FERC wrote that it
would "reconsider what further regulatory steps are in the public
interest."l165
By the middle of 2005, FERC had released three additional
orders 166 that required public utilities to revise their open access
159 Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order 889: Open Access
Same-Time Information System (formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and
Standards of Conduct Issued, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737-01 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18
C.F.R. pt. 37).
160 Final Rulemaking, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Regional Transmission
Organizations, 89 FERC 161,285 (1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [Hereinafter
Order 2000], available at www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf.
161 Id.
162Id. at 115.
163 Id. at 117.
6 Id. at 2.165 Id. at 4.166 Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Standardization of
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 104 FERC 1 61,103 (2003)
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transmission tariffs to include standard procedures and interconnection
agreements for generators and to take the unique technical properties of
large-scale wind farms into account in these agreements. In each order,
FERC cited its authority in sections 205 and 206 of the FPA to remedy
undue discrimination. In one order FERC wrote that, "interconnection is a
critical component of transmission service, and having a standard
interconnection procedures and a standard agreement . .. will limit
opportunities for transmitting utilities to favor their own
generation .. . [and] remove unfair impediments to market entry .. ."167
Once again, the federal government asserted authority to enable new
entrants in intrastate electricity markets. Over the course of a decade,
FERC had vastly expanded its power over the country's electricity
infrastructure using provisions in the FPA that had been largely untouched
by Congress since 1935.
In August 2005, Congress passed The Energy Policy Act of 2005
("2005 Act"), 6 the most recent piece of federal legislation significantly
affecting electricity regulation. The 2005 Act was passed in the wake of a
massive blackout in the northeastern United States that affected 50 million
people, cost $6 billion, and was blamed on congested transmission lines in
Ohio. 169 Electricity reliability and transmission policy were therefore two
areas of Congressional interest. The 2005 Act granted FERC the authority
to site transmission facilities. 170 The federal government had siting
authority over electricity infrastructure since 1920, but its power had been
largely limited to hydroelectric projects. FERC's 2005 power could only
be exercised in regions designated by DOE as areas of "national
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and
Procedures (2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Interconnection for Wind Energy 111 FERC 1 61,353 (2005)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
167 Final Rulemaking: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Standardization of Small
Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures (2005) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35).
168 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
6 JR Minkel, The 2003 Northeast Blackout - Five Years Later, Sci. Am. (Aug. 2008),
available at http://www.sciam.com/article.cfim?id=2003-blackout-five-years-later.
170 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1221(b) 119 Stat. 594, 947 (2005)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(p)).
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interest"17 ' and in the following five scenarios: (1) if the relevant state
does not have the authority to approve the siting, (2) if the relevant state
does not have authority to take potential interstate benefits into account,
(3) if the applicant does not serve customers in the relevant state and
therefore cannot apply to the local authority, (4) if the state authority has
withheld approval for more than one year, 172 or, (5) if the state authority
has conditioned its approval in such a way that construction will not
reduce congestion or will make congestion reduction economically
unfeasible.173
The 2005 Act also required that FERC adopt a rule establishing
incentive ratemaking for transmission infrastructure to help promote
171 "In determining whether to designate a national interest electricity transmission
corridor .. . the Secretary may consider the (A) economic vitality and development of the
corridor, or the end markets served by the corridor, may be constrained by lack of
adequate or reasonably priced electricity; (B)(i) economic growth in the corridor, or the
end markets served by the corridor, may be jeopardized by reliance on limited sources of
energy; and (ii) a diversification of supply is warranted; (C) the energy independence of
the United States would be served by the designation; (D) the designation would be in
the interest of national energy policy; and (E) the designation would enhance national
defense and homeland security." Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1221,
119 Stat. 594, 946 (2005) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(p)).
172 In February 2009, the Fourth Circuit limited the scope of FERC's authority under the
Energy Policy Act. Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 558 F. 3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 2009). FERC had interpreted the phrase
"withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing of [a permit] application" in case
(4) to include a state's outright denial of an application. Id. The court ruled that FERC's
interpretation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, and FERC may not issue a
permit when a state has affirmatively denied an application. Id. According to the court,
the Commission's reading would mean that Congress has told state commissions that they
will lose jurisdiction unless they approve every permit application in a national interest
corridor. Id. Under such a reading it would be futile for a state commission to deny a
permit based on traditional considerations like cost and benefit, land use and
environmental impacts, and health and safety ... In providing for this measured transfer
of jurisdiction, Congress simply makes sure that there is a utility commission available-if
not a state commission, then FERC-to make a timely and straightforward decision on
every permit application in a national interest corridor. In short, §216(b)(1), read as a
whole, does not indicate that Congress intended to bring about the sweeping transfer of
jurisdiction suggested by FERC. Id.
173 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1221(b)(1) 119 Stat. 594, 947 (2005)
(current version at 16 U.S.C. § 8 2 4 (p)).
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reliability and reduce congestion, 174 certify an organization to establish
and enforce reliability standards for transmission system reliability, 7 5 and
establish incentive-based rates for interstate transmission that will attract
new investment.176 The Act also amended PURPA17 7 to require state
commissions to "consider" adopting a net metering tariff,178 developing a
plan to minimize dependence on a single fuel source, increasing the
efficiency of generation, and implementiig time-based rate schedules.
Additionall , the 2005 Act repealed the remaining provisions of the
PUHCA 1 and eliminated the mandatory purchase requirement
established by PURPA with regard to Qualifying Facilities if FERC made
a finding that the relevant Facility has access to a competitive wholesale
market.180
To summarize, from 1978 to 2005 Congress and FERC vastly
expanded the federal government's role in electricity regulation. One
method of doing so, which was used in PURPA and the 1992 and 2005
Acts, was to require state commissions to "consider" adopting policies.
This tactic was designed to bring uniformity to disparate state commission
practices and motivate laggard state commissions to adopt the more
progressive practices that had already been implemented by other state
commissions around the country. A second area of expansion was into
intrastate electricity markets. PURPA's Section 210, the 1992 Act's
definition of an EWG, and various FERC orders beginning with 888 led to
an increase in non-utility generation and alternative generating
technologies. However, despite these repeated attempts by the federal
174 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1241, 119 Stat. 594, 961 (2005)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824(s) (2006)).17 1Id. § 1211, 119 Stat. 594, 941 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(o)).
76 Id. § 1241, 119 Stat. 594, 961 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(s)).
n Id. § 1251, 119 Stat. 594, 962 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 824(s)).
178 "Net metering service means service to an electric consumer under which electric
energy generated by that electric consumer from an eligible on-site generating facility
and delivered to the local distribution facilities may be used to offset electric energy
provided by the electric utility to the electric consumer during the applicable billing
eriod." Id.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1263, 119 Stat. 594, 974 (2005).
1so Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, § 1253, 119 Stat. 594, 967 (2005)
(current version at U.S.C. § 824a-3(m)).
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government to bring greater uniformity and competition to the industry,
substantial differences between the states remain.
E. Differences Between the States
Each state has its own body of laws, regulations, and
administrative decisions that govern electricity regulation. Although
many states' regulatory regimes can be traced back to the 1907 Wisconsin
law, and every state regulatory regime began with similar principles,
major differences between the states have emerged over the last forty
years.
Utility planning was historically driven by managers who justified
expansion based on their own projections for demand growth, expected
facility retirements and plans for meeting that demand in terms of
generation and transmission lines to link the plants to load centers.' 8 1
State commissions began to widen their scope from their traditional focus
on ratemaking and utility finances to include careful scrutiny of utility
planning.182  By 1991, nearly all states had adopted some form of
integrated resource planning ("IRP"), broadly defined as the development
of demand- and supply-side energy options designed to result in the
maximum benefits for consumers and include analyses of environmental
externalities, resource availability and load forecasting.' 8 3 Implementation
of IRP, however, likely varies widely among states and depends on the
exact language of statutes and regulations as well as state commission
181 Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu:
Evolving Notions of the "Public Interest" In Balancing State and Regional
Considerations, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 705, 721 (2010).
182 Daniel Yergin, Gary Simon, & I.C. Bupp, Caught in the Muddle: The Dilemma of
Today's Electric Power Industry, 8 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (1993); see also
Swartwout, supra note 2, at 323-28 (describing how public utility commissions
increasingly mixed traditional utility economic and rate regulation with "social regulation
functions." Social regulation included "public safety, public health, and the
environment." State commissions also undertook "prudence reviews" of investment
decisions, which shifted the burden to utilities of proving that their investments were not
imprudent).
1 Clinton A. Vince, Sherry A. Quirk, Stuart J. Rabin, Integrated Resource Planning:
The Case for Exporting Comprehensive Energy Planning to the Developing World, 25
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (1993).
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practices. Congress clearly approved of this expansion of the role of state
commissions. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 required all states that had
not already done so to consider adopting IRP.184
The 1992 Act prohibited FERC from requiring retail wheeling,ss
or providing customers with a choice among providers of retail electricity,
but many states took up the initiative. In 1994, California and a few other
states with relatively high electric rates began the process of opening retail
electricity markets to competition and consumer choice.18  By 2002,
twenty-four states enacted legislation or issued regulatory orders to offer
retail choice to customers. 17 This movement quickly stalled and
retreated. In 2010, only fifteen states offered retail choice.' 88
Opening up the retail market to competition was related to further
restructuring of the electricity industry in some states. By September
1999, twenty-one states had passed legislation dealing with divestiture of
generation assets by utilities, with five states requiring utilities to sell at
least some of their generation assets and a handful of other states explicitly
granting the state commission authority over divestiture of generation.189
In some states, utilities sold off generation assets on their own initiative,
and in many states generation was sold to affiliate companies of
utilities.190 Today, there is a great disparity among states in how much
184 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § I 11, 106 Stat. 2776, 2795 (1992)
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2006).
185 "Prohibition on Mandatory Retail Wheeling and Sham Wholesale Transactions: No
order issued under this Act shall be conditioned or require the transmission of electric
energy: (1) directly to an ultimate consumer, or (2) to, or for the benefit of, an entity if
such electric energy would be sold by such entity directly to an ultimate consumer .... "
Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §722(h), 106 Stat. 2776, 2016 (1992)
(codified as 16 U.S.C. § 824k (2006)).
186 David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in Restructured Electricity Market, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 187, 201 (2005).
1 U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Lessons Learned from Electricity Restructuring:
Transition to Competitive Markets Underway, But Full Benefits Will Take Time and
Effort to Achieve (Dec. 2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0327l.pdf.
188 U.S. Energy Admin. Info., Status of Electricity Restructuring by State (Sept. 2010),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure-elect.html.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Divestiture of Generation Assets by Investor-Owned
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power is generated by traditional utilities as compared to independent
power producers. For example, Massachusetts imports 30% of its
electricity and utilities generate only 1% of all electricity generated in the
state.191 In Indiana, which is a net exporter of electricity, utilities generate
90% of the state's total generation. 192 These differences are a reflection of
legislative and regulatory choices. Massachusetts was among the first
states to implement retail choice; later legislation provided financial
incentives for vertically integrated utilities to sell their generation
assets,1 93 and the legislature and various regulatory bodies have been
actively reshaping the industry over the past fifteen years. 194 Indiana's
legislature, by contrast, has kept the traditional vertically integrated
structure of the industry largely intact.1 95
191 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Massachusetts Electricity Profile, 2009 Edition,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/stprofiles/massachusetts.html.
192 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Indiana Electricity Profile, 2009 Edition,
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/stprofiles/indiana.html.
193 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 164, §§ 1-8 (2008) ("An Act Relative to Restructuring the
Electric Utility Industry in the Commonwealth, Regulating the Provision of Electricity
and Other Services, and Promoting Enhanced Consumer Protection").
194 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Massachusetts Restructuring,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/massachusetts.html (stating a
digest of activities).
19 5 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Indiana Restructuring (Apr.
2007),http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/indiana.html (showing
little activity with regard to restructuring); see also Ind. Code, public utility laws (2011),
available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title8/arl/ (showing no structural
changes implemented by the legislature); see also Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm'n, Report
to the Regulatory Flexibility Committee of the Indiana General Assembly 12 (2010),
http://www.in.gov/iurc/files/Report-to-theRegFlexCommittee_2010.pdf (noting that
utilities "are vertically integrated, which means they own facilities for generation,
transmission, and distribution" and "Indiana electric utilities operate under a traditional
regulatory regime administered by the IURC). Under this regulatory framework, the
utility owns and operates generation, transmission, and distribution facilities in order to
provide electric retail service to customers in a defined exclusive service territory. Retail
customers are billed for service based on the average embedded cost to serve, including
an authorized reasonable rate of return on investment. Generation resources owned by
utilities are economically dispatched such that generation output meets customer demand.
Indiana utilities are responsible for short-term and long-term planning to meet customer
demand at the lowest reasonable cost." Id. at 17. The major change in the operation of
the state's utilities is that Indiana participates in two RTOs which "direct the operation in
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Coal represents another major difference among states. States that
produce coal or are neighbors of major coal producing states generate
most of their electricity from coal, have the among the lowest electricity
rates in the country and emit the most carbon dioxide per megawatt-hour
of electricity generated (CO2/MWh). In short, dirty power is cheap,
especially if the dirty resource is located close to the state's power plants.
















North Dakota 1 7 93% 87% 9
Wyoming 2 1 96% 91% 1
Indiana 3 15 90% 93% 6
Kentucky 4 3 89% 93% 3
West Virginia 5 5 74% 96% 2
Delaware* 6 38 11% 58% n/a
Iowa 7 12 83% 73% n/a
Missouri** 8 11 98% 81% 23
Utah 9 6 97% 82% 13
Ohio 10 29 70% 84% 11
New Mexico 11 20 87% 73% 12
*Most of Delaware's electricity is generated out-of-state
**Missouri is bordered by five coal producing states, including Kentucky and
Illinois, two of the largest producers.
States with inexpensive, dirty electricity generally chose not to
restructure. Of the top eleven states in terms of CO2/MWh, only
Delaware and Ohio have restructured their electricity industries. On the
real time of all generating facilities in their regions to ensure that the lowest-cost
combination of generation resources is being used at any given moment. Additionally,
RTOs engage in long-term resource planning in order to achieve greater optimality in the
construction of new resources."
196 All electricity statistics are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration from
2009, with the exception of C02 data which is from 2008, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/electricity/epm0310.zip and
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/chgstr/restructure.pdf. Coal production statistics
are from http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/table6.html.
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other hand, the nine most expensive states, on average more than twice as
expensive as the ten cheapest, have all restructured their electricity
industries. Another major difference between the dirtiest and most
expensive states is that all of the dirtiest states, with the exceptions of
Delaware and Ohio, export electricity. Of the most expensive states, six
import electricity, thus keeping pollution out-of-state.
Table 2: State statistics and rankings based on in-state generation, most expensive
states' 97
Rank by Rank by % Electricity % Electricity Rank by
CO2/MWh Price of Generated by Generated by Coal
Generated Electricity Utilities Coal Production
Vermont 33 39 11% 0% n/a
Maine 34 40 31% 0% n/a
Maryland 35 41 1% 55% 19
California 36 42 50% 1% n/a
Rhode Island 37 44 1% 0% n/a
New Jersey 38 45 1% 9% n/a
New
Hampshire 39 46 19% 14% n/a
Massachusetts 41 48 3% 25% n/a
New York 42 49 28% 10% n/a
Connecticut 43 50 1% 8% n/a
Another major legislative difference between states that has
emerged more recently is whether or not the state has a Renewable
Portfolio Standard ("RPS"). An RPS typically mandates that each utility
procure a certain percentage of its power from renewable generation
sources. Thirty-five states have an RPS or an Alternative Energy Portfolio
Standard ("AEPS"), 198 and their goals vary widely from requiring 25% of
197 Alaska and Hawaii have been omitted because they cannot participate in regional
markets.
198 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Renewable & Alternative Portfolio Standards
(Oct. 27, 2010), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s-being_done/inthe-states/rps.cfm (last visited Aug.
16, 2011) [hereinafter Pew RPS Chart]. Note that Florida never passed an RPS. Id. Four
states have voluntary goals, meaning that utilities that fail to meet the goal are not
penalized. Id. Under a mandatory RPS, utilities often have to pay a fine for each
megawatt-hour that they fail to procure from renewable sources. Four states-Michigan,
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electricity to be generated by renewables by 2025 (Illinois) to mandating
only 1% of the state's current installed capacity.199 Of the five dirtiest
states in Table 1, North Dakota has a voluntary RPS, West Virginia has an
AEPS that allows utilities to meet goals with advanced coal
technologies, 200 and the other three states have not set any renewable
energy goals. Every state in Table 2 has an RPS.
States also have widely varying goals and policies with regards to
energy efficiency. Roughly half of states have an Energy Efficiency
Resource Standard or Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard that encourage
or mandate more efficient generation, transmission and distribution of
electricity.201 Typically an efficiency standard requires utilities to reduce
energy use by a specified percentage each year, and some states combine
efficiency targets with RPS goals by allowing efficiency improvements to
count towards the state's RPS. In its 2010 ranking of state energy
efficiency policies, the American Council for an Energy-Efficient
Economy ("ACEEE") observed that "states are demonstrating leadership
and innovation in developing and implementing energy efficiency
policies" and predicted that "states will continue to guide our nation's
direction in clean energy." 202 The ranking demonstrates vast disparities
among the states. While California leads the nation with a maximum
cumulative score of 50, based on a "comprehensive assessment of policy
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia-have Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards
which allow some of the requirement to be met with advanced fossil fuel technologies,
such as carbon capture and sequestration and integrated gasification combined cycle. Id.
199 Iowa's RPS mandates only 105 MW of capacity by 2025, equivalent to only 1% of the
state's current installed capacity. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., State Electric Profile,
http://www.state.ia.us/goverment/com/util/energy/electricprofile.html. Regardless, as
of January 2010, there were 3,670 MW of wind capacity operating in Iowa. American
Wind Energy Ass'n, U.S. Wind Energy Projects-Iowa (Sept. 2010),
http://archive.awea.org/projects/projects.aspx?s=Iowa.
2oo See W. Va. Code § 24-2F-3 (2007) (defining "Alternative Energy Sources" as
including advanced coal technology, coal bed methane, fuel produced by coal
fasification, synthetic gas, and other fossil-fuel based sources).
01 Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Energy Efficiency Standards and Targets,
http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s-being done/inthestates/efficiencyresource.cfm
(last visited Aug. 16, 2011).202 Am. Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, The 2010 State Energy Efficiency
Scorecard I (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.aceee.org/node/820.
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and programs," thirteen states scored below 10, indicating that they had
few initiatives aimed at improving energy efficiency. 203 Not surprisingly,
there is a high correlation between energy efficiency policies and RPS
policies. The twenty highest ranked states in ACEEE's ranking all have
an RPS. 204 Of ACEEE's bottom fifteen states, only five states have any
form of RPS goals, which includes one state with an AEPS that allows
advanced coal technologies (West Virginia) and two states with non-
mandatory goals (North and South Dakota).
This very brief overview of state electricity legislation and
regulation is intended to demonstrate only that there are significant
differences between the states, and those differences can be the result of
choices by legislatures and state commissions. In some cases, those
choices are influenced by coal mining and a state's historic relationship
with that industry. In other states, those choices may be motivated by
historic high electricity prices and environmental concerns. As FERC
recently observed, "significant differences exist between regions,
including differences in industry structure, mix of ownership, sources for
electric generation, population densities, and weather patterns. Some
regions have organized spot markets administered by an RTO or ISO, and
others rely solely on bilateral contracting between wholesale sellers and
buyers."205
PART II: CURRENT ISSUES IN ELECTRICITY POLICY - TRANSMISSION AND
CLEAN ENERGY
A. National Electricity Policies and Goals
In 1935, Congress set the parameters of its jurisdiction over
electricity regulation, establishing bright-line boundaries that held solidly
for four decades and have since slowly eroded. It also declared its
motivations for intervening in electricity regulation-encouraging
203 Id. at 3-4.204 Id. Although Iowa, ranked twelfth by ACEEE, has a very weak RPS, and Utah, which
is tied with Iowa in the ACEEE ranking, has only a voluntary goal. Id.
205 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 122 FERC 1
61,167 (Feb. 22, 2008).
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competition, ensuring reliability and remedying discrimination-which
served as rationales for much of the later federal action and are still
featured prominently in FERC rulemakings.206 The Federal Power Act of
1935 still serves as the foundation for all federal government activity in
the electricity industry.
With the passage of PURPA in 1978, Congress attempted to
harmonize state commissions around a set of national goals.207 Congress'
approach combined mandates that superseded the jurisdiction of state
commissions and recommendations that states were required to
"consider." 20 8 PURPA both required and motivated states to act. For
example, every state commission made a determination about the
calculation of "avoided costs" as they apply to rates for Qualifying
Facilities.209 Every state commission that had not already done so prior to
206 See, e.g., "We firmly believe that our authorities under the FPA not only permit us to
adapt to changing economic realities in the electric industry, but also require us to do so,
as necessary to eliminate undue discrimination and protect electricity customers. The
record supports our conclusion that, absent open access, undue discrimination will
continue to be a fact of life in today's and tomorrow's electric power markets." Order
888, supra note 146, at 10. See also, "the Commission reviewed evidence that traditional
management of the transmission grid by vertically integrated electric utilities was
inadequate to support the efficient and reliable operation that is needed for the continued
development of competitive electricity markets, and that continued discrimination in the
provision of transmission services by vertically integrated utilities may also be impeding
fully competitive electricity markets. Id.
207 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §2, 91 Stat. 3117,3119 (1978): (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2601(1) (2008)) (Congress found that the country
required increased conservation of electricity, improved efficiency of facilities and
resources, and equitable rates).208 See supra text accompanying notes 88-99.209 See Brent L. Vanderlinden, Note, Bidding Farewell to the Social Costs ofElectricity
Production: Pricing Alternative Energy Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act,13 J. Corp. L. 1011, 1024 (1988) ("Public Utility Commissions in forty-nine states [note
that Nebraska does not have a Public Utility Commission] have dealt with the question of
how to calculate avoided costs, but not all have chosen to adopt a fixed methodology for
the calculation. Definitions of what constitutes avoided costs, and the methodologies for
calculating them, vary widely from state to state."); see also Deirdre O'Callaghan &
Steve Greenwald, PURPA from Coast to Coast: American's Great Electricity
Experiment, 10 Nat. Resources & Env't. 17 (1996) (noting that the choice to putQualifying Facility rates in the hands of state commissions was at least partially made by
the FERC, not Congress).
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PURPA's passage was also required to hold formal hearings and make
written findings, and was given federal grants to do so, to consider
PURPA's ratemaking standards. Some states also went above and beyond
PURPA's requirements. At least seventeen state legislatures Fassed
implementing legislation,210 with some states passing multiple laws.
Since PURPA's enactment in 1978, the electricity industry has
undergone vast changes, including the increase of competition in
generation, the establishment of open access transmission, the growth of
wholesale electricity markets, the rise of regional transmission
organizations, the awareness of conservation and the introduction of
renewable portfolio standards. The impacts of these changes have varied
considerably by state, and Congress has not reacted strongly to the
disparities. In 1992, Congress indicated a preference towards enabling
competition, but many states have held on to the traditional regulated
monopoly structure of the industry. 212 In 1978, 1992 and 2005, Congress
attempted to unify states around conservation and efficiency, but the
country's electricity consumption has continued to grow. 2 13 Congress has
yet to articulate any goal about greenhouse gas emissions from the
electricity industry.
"Section 210 states that the FERC shall adopt 'such rules as it determines necessary to
encourage cogeneration and small power production. . . .' The statute requires that the
rate of purchase be (1) just and reasonable and in the public interest; and (2) shall not
discriminate against cogenerators or small power producers. In 1980, FERC adopted 18
C.F.R. Part 292 to implement PURPA 210. FERC determined that fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory rates meant 'full avoided cost' and established in the federal
regulations a framework for state regulatory agencies to implement the federal standard.
States were allowed to implement FERC's rules by rulemaking, case-by-case
adjudication or 'any other reasonable procedure." Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)-
See Martin, supra note 128, at 171 n.194.
211 Id. (describing post-PURPA legislation in Maine and California).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 185-188.
213 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electricity Overview 1949-2009,
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/datalannualtxt/ptb08Ol.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
Year-to-year electricity consumption increased every year from 1949 to 2009, except for
1974, 1982, 2001, 2008, and 2009. Overall growth from 1949 to 2009 was 1,367%. Id.
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Since 2005, there have been numerous bills proposed that include
major reforms to electricity regulation. 214 This paper will look at two
areas targeted for possible reform, transmission siting and clean electricity
generation, in light of the history of federal-state jurisdiction explored in
Part I.
B. Transmission
Regional coordination and planning have been part of the
electricity industry since three utilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania
211formed "the world's first continuing power pool" in 1927. In 1935, the
Federal Power Act of 1935 empowered the FPC to promote regional
216coordination. As electricity expanded its reach with ever larger
centralized generators, regional pooling became a standard industry
practice.217 In the aftermath of a major blackout in 1965, the National
Electric Reliability Council was established to ensure greater reliability.
In 1999, FERC issued criteria for Regional Transmission Organizations.
Today, twenty-seven states are at least mostly covered by a FERC-
approved RTO or Independent System Operator ("ISO"), and every other
state is part of an organization that performs some of the functions of an
214 There are many examples of proposed bills from the 11Ith Congress, many of which
include both transmission siting reform and sections about increasing renewable
generation. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. (2009); Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act, S. 539,
111th Cong. (2009); American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, S. 1462, 111th
Cong. (2009); Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 11Ith Cong. (2010);
National Energy Security Act of 2009, S. 774, 111th Cong. (2009); Sound Management
of America's Resources and Technologies for Energy Act of 2009 (SMART Energy Act),
S. 807, 11 Ith Cong. (2009).215 PJM Heritage, http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/pjm-heritage.aspx (last
visited Apr. 25, 2011).
216 The Federal Power Act "empowered and directed" the FPC to "divide the country into
regional districts for the voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities for the
generation, transmission, and sale of electric energy" and provided the FPC with the
"duty" to "promote and encourage such interconnection and coordination within each
such district and between such districts." Federal Power Act, ch. 687, § 202, 49 Stat. 848
(1935) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (2006)).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 79-87.
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RTO/ISO. 218 These regional entities engage in rigorous long-term
transmission planning, and FERC-approved RTOs/ISOs have the authority
to allocate costs of new projects among their member utilities. These
regional entities do not have the authority to site transmission lines.
The limited authority granted to FERC in the 2005 Act to site
transmission lines was designed to overcome perceived deficiencies in
state laws. State approval processes are rooted in the traditional vertically
integrated utility paradigm under which the costs of new transmission are
allocated to the incumbent utility's ratepayers based on an understanding
that these customers will benefit from the new transmission.2 19 State laws
and regulations therefore often require that its approval process focus on
the costs and benefits accruing to in-state ratepayers only while ignoring
the project's regional impacts. Three of the five scenarios under which
FERC has authority over siting under the 2005 Act involve a state's lack
of legal authority to approve the project because of the parochial nature of
its framework for approval. 220
218 FERC recognizes seven RTOs or Independent System Operators (ISOs) that meet the
requirements of Order 2000: California ISO, the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas,
Southwest Power Pool, Midwestern Independent System Operator, PJM Interconnection,
New York ISO, and New England ISO. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO) (May 17 2011),
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp. In total, 27 states
are mostly covered by a FERC-certified regional entity. Id. (also showing map of the
regions). FERC also recognizes that "public utility transmission providers in regions
outside of RTOs and ISOs have relied on [the following organizations] to comply with
certain requirements of Order No. 890 ... the North Carolina Transmission Planning
Collaborative, Southeast Inter-Regional Participation Process, SERC Reliability
Corporation, ReliabilityFirst Corporation, Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, Florida
Reliability Coordination Council, WestConnect, ColumbiaGrid, and Northern Tier
Transmission Group. Final Order, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 131 FERC 61,253 (2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)
[hereinafter June 17 NOPR]. Utilities and other entities that cover substantial portions of
every state (other than Alaska and Hawaii) participate in either a FERC-certified
RTO/ISO or one of these other entities that fulfill some requirements of FERC's Order
890.219 See generally Brown & Rossi, supra note 181.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 146-147. The relevant scenarios are: (1) If the
relevant state does not have the authority to approve the siting; (2) If the relevant state
does not have authority to take potential interstate benefits into account; and (3) If the
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In the 2005 Act, Congress provided states with means of avoiding
federal jurisdiction. One option was for states to amend their laws and/or
221regulations to preclude a scenario that would trigger federal jurisdiction.
For example, under the 2005 Act, FERC could approve an interstate
transmission line provided it was located in a designated region and the
relevant states did not have authority to account for interstate benefits in
its approval process. A state legislature could avoid FERC's jurisdiction
by granting its state commission the authority to account for a project's
interstate benefits. A second option was for a state to enter into an
agreement with at least two contiguous states to establish a regional
transmission siting agency.22 2 With the exception of dispute resolution,
FERC would not have siting authority in states that had entered into
regional agreements. While Congress attempted to motivate reform at the
state level, because the 2005 Act provided FERC with such limited
authority, subject to geographic and substantive limitations, it failed to
induce states to bring their siting procedures in line with Congress'
standards.
There are two major issues with respect to state-by-state
transmission siting. First, roughly thirty states give a single state agency
exclusive jurisdiction over siting of transmission lines, but the remaining
states require multiple local governments to approve a new transmission
project.2 Working with a single agency is likely to be faster and cheaper
for entities building new transmission lines. Each local approval is an
additional cost to the builder with its own set of unique concerns and
opportunities for new interveners and for local authorities to extract
concessions, such as financial payments or re-routing of the line.
Regardless of whether the state approval process includes local
governments, getting a large-scale transmission line approved is a lengthy
process. If the line traverses through federal land, environmental
applicant does not serve customers in the relevant state and therefore cannot apply to the
local authority.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 168-173.
222 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-58, §1221(i) 119 Stat. 594, 950 (2005)(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2006)).
223 Roughly twenty states still have a decentralized approach to transmission approvals.
Brown & Rossi, supra note 181, at 708 n.7 (citing Ashley C. Brown & Damon Daniels,
Vision Without Site, Site Without Vision, 16 Electricity J. 23, 24 (Oct. 2003).
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reviews 2 24 and multi-round review processes by regional transmission
entities, such as an RTO, can last for several years. 25 Given the long
duration of the overall approval process, whether the project requires
approval by a single state agency or by multiple local governments
certainly adds some complexity but in the grand scheme of the project
may not be a deal breaker.
The second problem with the state-by-state approval process is that
state agencies may lack the authority to approve interstate projects. State
regulators typically have to make an initial determination about the
226justification for construction of the new transmission line. Historically
those decisions were made in light of demand forecasts of the in-state
ratepayers and the supply of the incumbent vertically integrated monopoly
utility.227 However, interstate transmission lines, which may pass through
a state without providing in-state benefits, do not fit this historic paradigm.
State statutes, regulations, or utility commission practices may not
authorize or may make it unlikely that regulators can consider out-of-state
regional benefits or policy goals, such as whether the transmission project
will enable new renewable generation.228 Without authority to consider
224 See, e.g., Gateway West Transmission Line Project,
http://www.wy.blm.gov/nepa/cfodocs/gatewaywest/schedule.php (last visited Apr. 20,
2011) (showing that the NEPA process is expected to take more than three years-
potential lawsuits are not included.) As proposed, the Gateway West Transmission Line
Project will stretch 1,000 miles along southern Wyoming and Idaho, including 500 miles
through federal land managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Gateway West
Transmission Line Project: About This Project,
http://www.wy.blm.gov/nepa/cfodocs/gatewaywest/index.html (last visited Apr. 20,
2011).
225 See, e.g., Transwest Express, WECC Rating Process for TWE Project Advances to
Phase 2 Status (Feb. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.transwestexpress.net/news/briefs/02021 0-WECC-Phase-2.shtml (highlighting
that the TransWest project passed two of three rounds of review at the relevant regional
transmission planning organization). The process took more than two years. Id. The
TransWest project will move power from Wyoming through Utah and Colorado and
terminate near Las Vegas. Id.226 Brown & Rossi, supra note 181, at 721.
227 Id. at 706-08.
228 Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse ofElectric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39
Envtl. L. 1015, 1029 (2009).
253
A CHALLENGE FOR FEDERALISM
out-of-state benefits, state commissions are less likely to approve interstate
projects whose benefits do not accrue to in-state ratepayers.
A July 2008 survey of state statutes by the National Council on
Electricity Policy found that twenty-three states have statutes that
encourage coordination with neighboring states.229 In these states, statutes
may grant the state commission generic permission to cooperate, provide
authority to conduct joint investigations or hearings or issue orders with
neighboring states, or authorize the state commission to enter into
compacts. o The study notes that "language governing interstate
transmission siting varies throughout the country" and while some statutes
provide concrete direction, others are "nuanced in a way that may either
create opportunities for or prevent interstate coordination, depending on
interpretation." 231 Eleven states' statutes are silent on interstate
transmission siting and interstate coordination more broadly. 232 But eight
of these eleven states participate in a FERC-approved RTO/ISO despite
the lack of explicit statutory authorization.233 The report found that
"statutory language is not the determining factor in how well state's
coordinate with one another on transmission siting"234 and that "initiative"
and "perception of need" may be greater drivers of interstate
cooperation. 2s Ultimately, some states lack the initiative to either
participate in regional coordination efforts or to reform statutes and
commission practices that would enable approval of interstate projects.
Assuming an interest in fixing the problems with state siting
practices, Congress' first option is simply to maintain the status quo and
229 Julia Friedman & Miles Keogh, The National Council on Electricity Policy,
Coordinating Interstate Electric Transmission Siting: An Introduction to the Debate 7
(2008),
http://energy.gov/sites/Prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/TransmissionSiting_FIN
AL_41.pdf [Hereinafter NCEP Survey].
230 d
231 Id. at 7.
232id
233 See Id. at 7. For the map of relevant states, see Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO) (May
2011), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp for a map of RTO/ISO
coverage.
234 NCEP Survey, supra note 229, at 4.
235 id
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pass no new legislation that would further empower FERC. Despite its
lack of new authority since 2005, FERC has been active in reforming
transmission.236 A key issue is allocating costs for new transmission
among the utilities and merchant power providers in the affected region.
FERC and regional transmission organizations are working to find a
methodology that will increase investment in new transmission, and it
seems plausible that they can solve the problem without new legislation
from Congress.23 Cost allocation is a complicated issue238 and will not be
dealt with in detail in this paper. With regard to concerns about siting
statutes, the decision of whether or not to reform laws can be left to states.
Those states that want to facilitate the export of electricity can amend their
laws to more easily allow for the siting of new interstate transmission, as
236 See, e.g., June 17 NOPR, supra note 218 (proposing reforms to transmission cost
allocation, regional planning, and coordination between transmission planning regions);
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 18 C.F.R. pts.
35, 37 (2010) (amending the pro forma open access transmission tariff to ensure that it
remedies discrimination and adopting eight planning principles that require coordinated,
open, and transparent transmission planning on both a sub-regional and regional level);
Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 133 FERC 61,149 (2010) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35) proposing to reform the open access transmission tariff so it meets the
needs of variable resources such as wind; and Final Rule, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Promoting a Competitive Market for Capacity Reassignment 132 FERC
61,238 (Sept. 10, 2010) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (lifting the price cap for all electric
transmission customers reassigning transmission capacity, which is intended to help
facilitate the development of a market for electric transmission capacity reassignments as
a competitive alternative to transmission capacity acquired directly from the transmission
owner).
237 See, e.g., Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., 133 FERC 1 61,
221 (2010) (accepting a proposal from the Midwest ISO to establish a new category of
transmission projects, called Multi Value Projects, that are determined to "enable the
reliable and economic delivery of energy in support of documented energy policy
mandates or laws .... Filing Parties propose that the costs of MVPs be allocated all load
in, and exports from, Midwest ISO on a postage-stamp basis."). See also June 17 NOPR,
supra note 218 (FERC proposes new cost allocations methodologies).
238 See A Survey of Transmission Cost Allocation Issues, Methods and Practices (Mar.
10, 2010), http://ftp.pjm.com/-/media/documents/reports/20100310-transmission-
allocation-cost-web.ashx (explaining five general methodologies for allocating costs of
new transmission).
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some states have already done. 239 Furthermore, a recent study by the
Edison Electric Institute, a prominent industry association,240 found that
transmission investment has been growing, and the Institute credits the
2005 Act and FERC pricing policies as key to sustaining continued
growth.241 Despite the challenges with current state laws, regulations and
administrative practices, new transmission projects are actually moving
forward.
Notwithstanding the growth in investment, Congress may still find
it beneficial to unify states around a common understanding for the siting
of interstate transmission projects. In addition to simplifying the process
for transmission builders, pushing states to update their transmission siting
policies can be part of a larger effort to bring state electricity policies in
line with the changed industry. One tactic would be to follow the model
of Title I of PURPA, repeated in the 1992242 and 2005243 Acts, of
239 Wyoming, for example, has created the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority (WIA),
whose mission is "to diversify and expand the Wyoming economy through improvements
in the state's electric transmission infrastructure and to facilitate the consumption of
Wyoming energy by planning, financing, constructing, developing, acquiring,
maintaining and operating electric transmission facilities, advanced coal technology
facilities, advanced energy technology facilities and related supporting
infrastructure . . . ." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-5-303(a) (2010). The Authority can
participate in planning, financing, constructing, developing, acquiring, maintaining and
operating electric transmission facilities and their supporting infrastructure. The WIA
also has authority to "acquire by condemnation within the state of Wyoming any
properties necessary or useful for its purposes . . . ." Id. § 37-5-304(a)(v).
Edison Electric Institute, About Us,
http://www.eei.org/whoweare/abouteei/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).241 Edison Electric Institute, Transmission Projects: At a Glance (Feb. 2010),
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/ElectricityTransmission/Documents/Trans Projectlowres.
pdf ("Despite the economic downturn, the investment being made by EEI member
companies is significant and growing, and reflects preparation for future customer needs.
From 2001 to 2008, EEI members invested nearly $57.5 billion in transmission
infrastructure improvements to meet these various needs .... This trend in increased
transmission investment is due, in part, to several landmark developments in federal and
state policies affecting transmission infrastructure, notably, the Energy Policy Act of
2005 [ ] and federal transmission pricing policies being implemented by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission .... The adoption of these pricing policies is helping to
sustain the continued level of investment growth.").
242 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, §§111, 106 Stat. 2776, 2795
(amending PURPA).
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requiring state commissions to "consider" a federal standard. Some states
will likely require a statutory fix, but for the twenty-three states with
statutes permitting state commissions to work with neighboring states in
some capacity, a regulatory process may prove enough to ensure that
regional benefits can be accounted for in the evaluation of interstate
transmission projects. Similarly, Congress could also require state
commissions to consider accounting for public policy goals, such as a
state's RPS, and regional transmission planning processes 244 in
transmission siting decisions and reform ratemaking to avoid the
possibility that in-state ratepayers will bear the financial risk of a
transmission line that largely benefits other states.245 Under the PURPA
model, state commissions would be required to hold formal hearings and
make determinations in writing about federal standards for interstate
transmission project evaluation. Allowing state commissions to
implement the standards themselves will give states discretion to tailor the
standards to their own circumstances.
Inevitably, some states will reject Congress' standards and others
will require a legislative fix. Rather than superseding state authority,
Congress can again borrow a practice from previous electricity legislation
to encourage states to reform their statutes. One option is for Congress to
require a joint FERC-States Commission to study reforming state siting
statutes and require that FERC submit a report to Congress. 24 6 Such a
243 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §1251, 119 Stat. 594, 962 (amending
PURPA).
244 See June 17 NOPR, supra note 218 (describing generally the current requirements for
regional transmission planning and the deficiencies of the current framework).
245 See Brown & Rossi, supra note 181, at 709 (noting that in states that still use the
traditional vertically integrated utility paradigm the cost of each new transmission facility
is included in the retail rate of the utility building it. Revenues derived from customers
outside of the utility's franchise area may be credited back to local customers, but the full
risk of the residual revenue responsibility is generally borne by local customers. This
practice makes the allocation of costs a critical part of obtaining approval for a proposed
new line. It is unlikely that a state commission will allow a utility to build a line if the
costs, or even the revenue risk, are to be borne by local customers while the benefits
largely accrue out of state).
246 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required two such studies. See Energy Policy Act of
2005 § 1234 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 16432) (requiring that the "Secretary, in
coordination and consultation with the States, shall conduct a study on" economic
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commission, which could be broken down into regional groups, would
allow states to provide input to Congress on the issue and an opportunity
for states to collaborate with FERC to craft solutions that would both meet
national goals and maintain state authority over siting. More importantly,
states would be put on notice that Congress is considering nationalizing
transmission siting, which could have the effect of motivating state
legislatures to reform their siting statutes to avoid federal jurisdiction.
Similarly, rather than establishing a joint commission, Congress could
simply make a finding that state transmission siting practices need to be
reformed, declare the principles on which that reform should be based, and
reserve the right to usurp state authority at a future date.247 Such a finding
may also motivate states to take preemptive action to avoid federal
jurisdiction.
A more drastic move would be for Congress to expand FERC's
backstop authority established in the 2005 Act to include the entire
country. Such authority would still be constrained by factors similar to
those enumerated in the 2005 Act and could become effective starting one
or two years after the passage of the bill, giving states enough time to
amend their siting statutes to avoid federal jurisdiction. Putting states on
notice that Congress is considering usurping state authority may seem
unnecessary, as states have been aware of the possibility at least since the
passage of the 2005 Act, but actual action by Congress including a hard
deadline for state action could produce results. In 2009, Lauren Azar,
president of the Organization of the Midwestern ISO States and a member
of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, speculated that if FERC had
clear backstop authority states might be "more willing to get it done" and
dispatch of generation and submit an annual report to Congress and the states that
includes suggestions for legislative or regulatory changes.); see also id. § 1298 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §824(w)) (establishing "joint boards on a regional basis" to study economic
dispatch for various market regions. Congress required each state to nominate a
representative, and a FERC member would serve as chairman of each board. FERC was
required to submit a report that includes any consensus recommendations for statutory or
regulatory reform).
247 There is no exact parallel in the 2005 Act. In § 1236 Congress declares "that it is the
sense of Congress that FERC should carefully consider the States' objections" about to a
proposal to implement "a specific type of locational installed capacity mechanism in New
England pending before FERC." Id. § 1236.
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compromise.248 Reforming state siting statutes will involve compromises
that states may not be willing to make without a clear message from
Congress. The tradeoff may be that states can fundamentally retain
jurisdiction over siting, but they must incorporate national goals in their
approval processes. While states that have not already done so may have
to sacrifice their traditional regulatory models valuing in-state ratepayers
above out-of-state benefits, the ability to maintain control over land-use
decisions may be a tradeoff states are ultimately willing to make.
A more radical proposal vests FERC with full authority over the
siting of interstate transmission lines, as it has over interstate gas
pipelines,249 and cut states out of the process. There are differences,
however, between transmission lines and gas pipelines in terms of
traditional land use considerations, such as visibility, 250 land area
251 252requirements, and effect on property values. On the other hand, both
248 Katherine Ling, Modern Grid Needs National Policy, Federal Siting (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.eenews.net/public/eenewspm/print/2009/03/02/2.249 The interstate transportation and sale of natural gas came under the jurisdiction of the
federal government after the enactment of the Natural Gas Act in 1938. Natural Gas Act,
ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938). The Act, as amended in 1942, required all companies
engaged in the transportation of natural gas and companies constructing natural gas
facilities to have a certificate of public convenience issued to it by the Federal Power
Commission. In 1947, Congress amended the Act again and granted the power of
eminent domain to "any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity [who]
cannot acquire by contract ... the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and
maintain a pipeline or pipelines for the transportation of natural gas . . . ." Natural Gas
Act Amendments, ch. 333, 61 Stat. 459, § 7 (1947) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)).
250 Gas pipelines are typically buried underground. Interstate transmission towers vary in
height but are typically around 140 feet tall. American Electric Power, Transmission
Facts 3, http://www.aep.com/about/transmission/docs/transmission-facts.pdf (last visited
Apr. 23, 2011).
Gas pipelines typically require a right-of-way that is 75 to 100 feet wide during
construction and 50 feet permanently. Office of Energy Projects, Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, An Interstate Natural Gas Facility on My Land? What Do I Need to Know? 6-7
(July 2010), http://www.ferc.gov/for-citizens/citizen-guides/citz-guide-gas.pdf Rights-
of-way for interstate transmission lines are likely to be at least twice as wide, requiring a
minimum of 200 feet, and can be as wide as 900 feet. Am. Wind Energy Ass'n and the
Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n, Green Power Superhighways: Building a Path to America's
Clean Energy Future 8 fig. 2 (Feb. 2009),
http://www.awea.org/documents/GreenPowerSuperhighways.pdf.
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pipelines and transmission lines limit the land's usefulness and impede
future development. It seems uncontroversial to assert that the siting of
either pipelines or transmission lines involve significant local concerns.
Despite the relevance of local concerns, roughly thirty states have already
preempted local governments and consolidated siting of transmission lines
into a single state agency.25 3 This one-stop approach enabled "the public
to participate in utility planning and siting of facilities in exchange for a
single forum applying a single set of statewide policies for making siting
decisions that either preempt or allow for overruling local authorities." 254
Federalizing the siting process would further undercut local concerns,
which is likely to benefit industry, and it would remedy the inability of
states to approve projects that do not primarily benefit in-state interests.
Usurping state authority, however, may lead to a backlash from
state commissions and even state legislatures, particularly in those states
that have largely maintained the traditional regulatory paradigm. If
Congress is interested reforming the electricity sector, and more generally
creating a lower carbon economy, it is going to need the active
engagement of states. Dramatically reducing carbon emissions will
require a range of regulatory tools, many of which have been historically
252 According to industry-funded studies, gas pipelines have been found to have a
negligible effect on property values. See Eric Fruits, Natural Gas Pipelines and
Residential Property Values (Feb 2008),
http://www.oregonlng.com/pdfs3/appendices/RR-5/appendices/appendix5c.pdf. See also
Pacific Connector, The Facts About Natural Gas Pipelines,
http://www.pacificconnectorgp.com/faq.php (last visited Apr. 19, 2011). A study of
transmission lines rated at 250 kV to 500 kV found that they had little effect on the value
of agricultural land but as much as a 17% negative effect on properties in populated
areas. Cynthia A. Kroll and Thomas Priestley, The Effects of Overhead Transmission
Lines on Property Values 47 (July 1992),
http://staff.haas.berkeley.edu/kroll/pubs/tranline.pdf. But see Stanley W. Hamilton &
Gregory M. Schwann, Do High Voltage Electric Transmission Lines Affect Property
Value? 71 Land Econ. 436, 443 (1995) (finding that a statistical analysis of several
studies concluded that overhead wires of at least 69 kV have only a 6% negative effect on
the values of properties adjacent to the lines. The negative effect dissipates quickly as
distance from the lines increases). However, new interstate transmission lines are likely
to be rated significantly higher than 69 kV and may require wider rights-of-way and taller
towers.
253 See Rossi, supra note 228.
254 Brown & Rossi, supra note 181, at 207.
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under the jurisdiction of states and local governments, including land use
planning, building construction codes and public transportation.
Transitioning to an economy that uses more renewable energy and does so
more efficiently will take decades,255 and Congress should be careful not
to begin the endeavor by alienating its partners. Some states have shown
no interest in reform or in lowering carbon emissions, and Congress can
take any number of steps, such as those described in this paper, to
motivate change. Cutting the states entirely out of the process seems
unlikely to help in achieving longer-term and more ambitious goals.
C. Clean Electricity
In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama set a goal
of generating 80% of U.S. electricity from "clean energy sources" by
2035.256 President Obama was using a very inclusive definition of "clean
energy sources" that seemed to include every form of electricity
generation with the exception of coal without carbon capture and
sequestration ("CCS") technology.257 This definition contrasts with the
more restrictive definitions that many states have used for sources eligible
for RPS qualification.2 58 The President provided no details of how the
country could achieve this goal but left it to Congress to work out the
259specifics.
255 See Vaclav Smil, Energy at The Crossroads 60 Energy at The Crossroads: Global
Perspectives and Uncertainties 60 (2003) (writing that "slow substitutions of both
primary energies and prime movers should temper any bold visions of new sources and
new techniques taking over in the course of a few decades ... dominant energy systems
during the first decades of the twenty-first century will not be radically different from
those of the last generation.").
256 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 25, 2011), in N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/politics/26obama-
text.html?_r-1 &pagewanted=all.
257 Id. ("So tonight I challenge you to join me in setting a new goal: By 2035, 80% of
America's electricity will come from clean energy sources. Some folks want wind and
solar. Others want nuclear, clean coal, and natural gas. To meet this goal, we will need
them all, and I urge Democrats and Republicans to work together to make it happen.").
258 See infra text accompanying notes 266-276.259 d
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President Obama, who supports reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, was indirectly acknowledging that there are only two ways to
significantly reduce C02 emissions from electricity generation: either
reduce the amount of electricity generated by coal combustion or capture
and sequester the C02 emitted by coal-fired plants. Coal combustion for
electricity generation is responsible for approximately 30% of all U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions. 260 Within the electricity sector, coal is
responsible for more than 80% of C02 emissions, with nearly all of the
rest coming from natural gas. 26 1 The electricity industry has been
reducing the percentage of electricity generated by coal. In 1996, coal
generated 52% of the country's electricity while natural gas generated
13%.262 In 2010, coal's share dropped to 45% while natural gas rose to
24%.263 The total amount of coal combusted by the electricity industry,
however, has actually increased by 4% from 1996 to 2009, peaking in
2007 at a 16% increase as compared to 1996.264
Non-hydro renewables, such as wind and solar, have grown as
well, from 2% of all electricity in 1996 to almost 4% in 20 10.265 A key
driver of renewable energy growth is state RPS goals. Thirty-five states
have set such goals for renewable energy generation, and nearly all of
these states have made the goals mandatory for utilities.266 According to
the Union of Concerned Scientists, if these RPS goals are met almost 80
gigawatts of renewable generation capacity will be added to the grid by
260 U.S. Enytl. Prot. Agency, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks:
1990-2008 2-18 tbl.2-12 (2010),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloadsl 0/US-GHG-Inventory-
2010_Report.pdf.26 1 d
262 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Net Generation by Energy Source Total (All Sectors),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/emp/tablel_1.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
263 id264 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Coal Consumption by Sector, 1949-2009,
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/txt/ptb07o3.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Net Generation by Energy Source Total (All Sectors),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/emp/tablel1.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).266 See Minkel, supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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2025.267 B comparison, there are currently 340 gigawatts of coal
generation26 that operate at roughly 60% capacity.269 With renewable
generation operating at lower capacities than coal, it is highly unlikely
President Obama's goal will be met with renewable generation alone.
Growing renewable energy's share of electricity generation can still play a
meaningful role in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, but if President
Obama's goal is adopted by Congress it will take more than existing state
RPS targets to clean up the electricity sector.
One foundational element of an RPS is defining what qualifies as
an eligible source.270 While biofuels, biomass, hydro, landfill gas,
photovoltaic solar and wind are eligible resources in every state,27 1 only
half of states include municipal waste, most states do not include
combined heat and power,272 and Ohio is the only state to include nuclear
energy.273 All coastal states with an RPS include tidal and wave energy as
267 Union of Concerned Scientists, Renewable Electricity Standards Toolkit,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/res/overviewgrowth.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2011).
268 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Existing Capacity by Energy Source,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epalepatlp2.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
269 Capacity factor is calculated as follows: Total generating capacity * 8,760 / actual
megawatt hours produced. Actual megawatt hours produced is also available from EIA.
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Net Generation by Energy Source (All Sectors),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/tablel_1.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
According to 2009 data, 338,000 Megawatts of coal produced 1,755,904,000 megawatt
hours of electricity. Id.
270 Nearly all states that have an RPS established it with legislation. See Pew Center on
Global Climate Change, supra note 198 (noting that Arizona and New York have RPS
established through regulatory action. Iowa's RPS was set by the governor, and
Colorado, Missouri, and Washington established theirs through ballot initiatives.).
271 U.S. Envtl Prot. Agency, Renewable Portfolio Standards: An Effective Policy to
Support Clean Energy Supply fig. 3, http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-
policy/renewable fs.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) [Hereinafter EPA RPS Chart].
72Id.
273 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4928.01 (A)(34)(d) (LexisNexis 2008) (defining "Advanced
Energy Resource" as including "advanced nuclear energy technology"); see also
Christine Stapleton, State Report Backs Nuclear Power as Clean Energy, THE PALM
BEACH POST NEWS, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/state/content/statelepaper/2008/12/3 1/greenenergy_0101.
html (claiming that only Ohio allows nuclear to qualify for its RPS).
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eligible resources.274 Biomass, while accepted by all states, may come
with qualifications. New Jersey, for example, requires that biomass be
"cultivated and harvested in a sustainable manner" 275 and Massachusetts
regulators recently revised eligibility requirements in light of a study
analyzing the lifecycle carbon dioxide emissions released by generating
electricity from in-state wood resources. 276 Generating electricity from
any combination of these sources is consistent with President Obama's
goal, but no state RPS goes far enough. State RPS targets typically end in
2020 or 2025, at least a decade before 2035, and with a few exceptions, do
not mandate more than 25% generation from eligible resources.
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia are the only
states with AEPSs which permit some of the state's annual targets to be
met with advanced fossil fuel technologies with the remainder from
renewables and efficiency.278 In Ohio, utilities can meet up to half of the
state's AEPS requirement 279 with "advanced energy resources," which
include coal with CCS technology and efficiency improvements that
increase generation without increasing carbon dioxide emissions, among
274 EPA RPS Chart, supra note 271.275 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 48:3-51 (2011) (Definitions relative to competition in the electric
power and gas industries: "Class I renewable energy" means electric energy produced
from solar technologies, photovoltaic technologies, wind energy, fuel cells, geothermal
technologies, wave or tidal action, and methane gas from landfills or a biomass facility,
provided that the biomass is cultivated and harvested in a sustainable manner.").
2 See Mass. Dept. of Energy Resources, Renewable Portfolio Standard - Biomass




Aug. 30, 2011) (stating "the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (DOER)
has released a draft proposed regulation to establish criteria that woody biomass facilities
must meet under the Massachusetts RPS. This proposed regulation is a result of careful
consideration of the Biomass Sustainability and Carbon Policy Study, subsequent public
comments on that study and public comments generally on biomass policy.").U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Portfolio Standards: An Effective Policy to
Support Clean Energy Supply fig. 2, http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-
policy/renewable fs.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).7 See supra text accompanying notes 198-200.
279 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4928.64(B) (West 2010).
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other eligible resources. 280 Pennsylvania's legislature included integrated
combined coal gasification technology as an eligible resource,281 Michigan
included gasification and coal with CCS technology,2 82 and West Virginia
allowed for a wide range of coal-based technologies. 28 While the
resource eligibility is wider than state RPS goals, these AEPS targets do
not go as far as Obama's 80% goal. West Virginia and Ohio have the
most ambitious goals, aiming for 25% of electricity generated by eligible
284
resources by 2025. West Virginia currently generates nearly all of its
electricity from coal with Ohio close behind, generating 84% of its
electricity from coal. Even if both states meet their targets, they may still
generate two-thirds of their electricity using old and polluting coal
technologies that are not in line with President Obama's clean electricity
goal.
Current state efforts can help achieve the President's 80% goal, but
they are insufficient by themselves. The industry, which has already been
moving to more natural gas and less coal, will likely get part of the way on
its own. However, if the country is going to meet President Obama's
target and move away from cheap, dirty coal, the federal government will
have to step up and play a role. It is worth briefly noting previous efforts
by the federal government to both directly and indirectly mandate fuel
switches in the electricity sector and clean up its pollution.
The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, ("Fuel Use
Act")285 passed by Congress along with PURPA, prohibited new power
plants from using natural gas or petroleum as a primary energy source 286
280 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4928.01(34) (West 2010) (defining "Advanced Energy
Resource" as including "[a]ny method or any modification or replacement of any
property, process, device, structure, or equipment that increases the generation output of
an electric generating facility to the extent such efficiency is achieved without additional
carbon dioxide emissions by that facility."). The statute specifically includes customer
cogeneration, carbon capture, advanced nuclear generation, fuel cell, solid waste, and
demand-side management.
21 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 1648.2 (West 2010).
282 Mich. Comp. Laws § 460.1003(c) (2010).
283 W. Va. Code § 24-2F-3 (2010).
284 Pew RPS Chart, supra note 198.
285 The Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat.
3289 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8484 (2006)).286Id. § 201, 92 Stat. at 3298 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 8311 (2006)).
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and reuired that existing power plants phase out the use of natural gas by
1990.2 The law was designed to encourage greater use of coal to
generate electricity but also included a number of exemptions allowing the
use of natural gas and petroleum. 288 The Act coincided with an end to the
construction of inefficient natural gas-powered steam electric generating
units ("EGU"). While nearly 37 gigawatts of natural gas-powered steam
EGUs came online in the 1970s, construction ceased and the market
shifted to turbines and more efficient combined cycle plants thereafter.28 9
Petroleum has been almost entirely phased out as a fuel for electricity
generation. In 1978, more than 600 million barrels of liquid petroleum
products were used to generate electricity in the U.S., and by 1990
petroleum use declined to 200 million barrels. 290 Put differently, in 1978,
petroleum generated 17% of U.S. electricity, yet by 1990 its share had
fallen to just 4% and in 2009 petroleum was used to generate less than 1%
of U.S. electricity.291 While the Fuel Use Act was just one factor that led
to these switches in generation technologies and fuels, after less than a
decade and facing an oversupply of natural gas, Congress repealed the
provisions that restricted the use of natural gas for electricity
*292generation.
As Congress was promoting coal in the 1970s it also began to
regulate pollution from coal power plants, which had the effect of
encouraging a shift from high-sulfur coal, found primarily in the eastern
half of the U.S., to low-sulfur coal, found in Wyoming and Montana. The
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgated the first sulfur
2871d. § 301, 92 Stat. at 3305 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 8323 (2006)).
288See Edward L. Lublin & Marvin G. Pickholz, Introduction to the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978: Securing Exemptions for Utilities and Major Industrial
Users, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 485, 489 (1980) [hereinafter Introduction to Fuel Use Act].
289 See 2009 Generator Report, supra note 123.
290 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review 2009 239 tbl. 5.13d
(2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdflaer.pdf.
291 Id. at 231 tbl. 8.2b.
292 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Repeal of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel
Use Act (1987), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oilgas/natural_gas/analysispublications/ngmajorleg/repeal.html
(last visited April 20, 2011).
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dioxide emission standards for coal power plants in 1971.293 Some power
plants met the requirement by switching to low sulfur coal rather than
installing costly pollution-controlling scrubbers. In 1977, eastern utilities
consumed 26 million tons of low-sulfur coal from the western United
States, up from 1 million tons in 1970 before the regulations went into
effect.294 From 1986 to 1995, production of low-sulfur coal in western
states increased at an annual rate of 5.5%, while production of
Appalachian coal grew at a rate of just .2% per year and coal output of
interior states declined by 1.7% annually.29 Some coal power plants
chose to install costly scrubbers to reduce sulfur emissions. By 1985,
roughly 20% of coal power plants had installed desulfurization scrubbers,
which increased steadily to about 40% in 2009.296
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 further restricted sulfur
emissions by first setting emissions limits for 110 of the dirtiest coal
power plants and then allowing all power plants to meet emissions goals
by switching to low sulfur coal or natural gas, installing scrubbers, shifting
electricity production from dirty to cleaner plants, or encouraging
customers to use electricity more efficiently. 297 While the federal scheme
was designed to give utilities the flexibility to choose the most efficient
means of reducing emissions, some state legislatures passed statutes that
limited utilities' options in order to protect local coal mining industries.
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, West Virginia, were among the coal
producing states that passed laws that granted their state commissions
298
authority over utilities' plans to meet the sulfur emissions requirements.
In Illinois, for example, state law specifically required utilities to install
293 Eugene M. Trisko, Universal Scrubbing: Cleaning the Air, 84 W. Va. L. Rev. 983,
985 (1982).
294 Id. at 986.
295 David McDermott, Coal Mining in the U.S.: Price and Employment Trends, 120
Monthly Lab. Rev. 18, 20 (1997).
296 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Installed Nameplate Capacity of Fossil-Fuel
Steam-Electric Generators with Environmental Equipment, 1985-2008 tbl 12.8 (2009),
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptbl208.html [Hereinafter EIA Sulfur Scrubber Chart].
297 Eileen L. Kahaner, GAO's Analysis of Title IV's Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance
Trading Program, 2 Envtl. Law. 239, 243 (1995).
298 Richard Warren Beckwith, Comment, From the Ashes of Wyoming v. Oklahoma
Arises the PUC Phoenix - Can Wyoming Combat Economic Protectionism in the Age of
the Clean Air Act Amendments, 29 Land & Water L. Rev. 59, 65 (1994).
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scrubbers, thus allowing them to continue to burn high-sulfur Illinois
coal.299 In Oklahoma, a state law, later struck down by the U.S. Supreme
Court, specifically required that utilities burning coal include at least 10%
from in-state mines to. prevent a complete switch to low-sulfur Wyoming
coal.300 On the other hand, other states provided utilities with incentives,
such as accelerated recovery of costs associated with installation of
scrubbers, for complying with the Clean Air Act Amendments.3 0 ' The
salient point is that states chose different paths to complying with the
federal emissions goal.
As the Obama Administration looks to reduce electricity
generation from coal, it may consider mandating a fuel switch, perhaps by
banning construction of new coal plants, phasing out older coal plants
through environmental regulations, or requiring new or existing coal
plants to use CCS technology. The comparisons to the Fuel Use Act and
sulfur regulations are not perfect, but a few ideas may still be relevant.
First, an outright ban on coal seems both politically unrealistic 302
and potentially shortsighted. One purpose of the Fuel Use Act of 1978
was to conserve natural gas for "essential uses," such as fertilizer
production and crop drying, for which there were."no feasible alternative
299 Id. at 69.
300 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
301 Alexander F. Skirpan Jr., Plus Ca Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose: 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act and Their Impact on Utility Regulation, 55 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 171, 199 (1993).
302 See, e.g., Jim Snyder and Kim Chipman, "Coal Lobby Spending Jumps 76% Fighting
US Air Pollution Rules." Bloomberg, Jun. 6, 2011, http://www.afriren.com/en/news/35-
coal-lobby-spending-jumps-76-fighting-us-air-pollution-rules, noting that in the first
quarter of 2011 "[e]nvoys from coal dependent utilities in the U.S. Midwest have visited
more than 90 congressional offices" in an attempt to thwart new EPA rules. Lobbying
expenses were $1.05 million by the National Mining Association, $2 million by
American Electric, $940,000 by the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity, and
$1.36 million by Peabody. See also The Center for Responsive Politics: Ranked Sectors,
2010, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?showYear-2010&indexType=c (last accessed
August 10, 2011). In 2010, companies and associations in the energy and natural
resources industries spent $450 million on lobbying, behind only health ($521 million)
and finance, insurance, and real estate ($475 million). Of the $450 million, nearly half
was spent by utilities and mining companies.
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fuels."303 At the time, Congress and the President were concerned about
dwindling supplies of domestic natural gas. 304 Since the Fuel Use Act was
repealed in 1987, construction of new natural gas powered generators has
increased dramatically,30 s proved domestic reserves have spiked,306 and
the recent substantial increase in shale gas production is considered by
some in the energy industry to be a revolutionary development. 307 With
hindsight, it looks like Congress' ban, while perhaps beneficial in the
short-run, was not the right strategy for the long-term. While it seems
unlikely that burning coal will ever be environmentally prudent, it is
possible that shale gas has been overhyped,308 nuclear will prove too
costly, 309 or there will be some unforeseeable reason why fuel diversity
will be valuable for the country's electricity system. It may be possible
for the use of coal to be prudently reduced, but a complete ban could
prove to be misguided.
Congress and the EPA may instead choose to place restrictions on
coal power plants that lead to the shutdown of the least efficient plants and
require new or existing plants to include CCS. A recent White House
report recognizes that widespread adoption of CCS technology is going to
take decades. 310 According to projections in the report, by 2035, 80
303 Introduction to Fuel Use Act, supra note 288, at 487 n. 18.
304 Id. at 486.
305 See 2009 Generator Report, supra note 123.
306 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dry Natural Gas Proved Reserves(Dec. 30, 2010),
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngri 1 nus_1 a.htm.
307 See, e.g., Daniel Yergin, Stepping on the Gas, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 2011 (calling the
increase in shale gas production "a potentially profound change in the global energy
equation" and concluding that the "shale gas revolution is both a major innovation and a
formidable new addition to our energy supply.")
308 See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Insiders Sound Alarm Amid a Natural Gas Rush, N.Y. Times,
Jun. 25, 2011 (writing that according to emails obtained by the New York Times, "energy
executives, industry lawyers, state geologists and market analysts voice skepticism about
lofty forecasts and question whether companies are intentionally, and even illegally,
overstating the productivity of their wells and the size of their reserves.")
309 Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Nuclear Nonsense: Why Nuclear Power
Is No Answer to Climate Change and the World's Post-Kyoto Energy Challenges, 33.
Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 26 (2008-2009) (discussing historic cost
overruns in the construction of nuclear power plants.)
310 Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage 8 (2010),
http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/sequestration/ccstf/CCSTaskForceReport20 1 0.pdf.
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gigawatts of coal generation will include CCS technolog, which will
likely be less than one-third of all coal generation capacity. 1 These CCS
projections, which assume a price on carbon, should be regarded as highly
uncertain. In 1976, an EPA analysis concluded that by 1990 there would
be 270 gigawatts of coal plants with sulfur scrubbers.3 12 The actual figure
in 1990 was only 70 gigawatts. 3 13
The more important lesson from the history of sulfur emissions
regulations is that Congress ought to provide states and utilities with the
flexibility to tailor general requirements. Coal states will likely want to
protect their in-state production, as many did in the early 1990s, and may
prefer expensive CCS technology instead of a switch to natural gas or
another fuel. Other states that prioritize low electricity prices may opt for
a combination of lower cost options, such as natural gas and wind, along
with some dirty coal. States that currently generate a relatively small
percentage of their electricity from coal may choose to abandon the fuel
entirely. States vary in available resources, environmental preferences and
regulatory histories, and federal policy has historically respected those
differences.
Articulating goals, and requiring consideration of a range of
methodologies, would be entirely consistent with the legislative patterns
established in PURPA and continued with the 1992 and 2005 Acts. This
is not to suggest that PURPA and the Energy Policy Acts of 1992 and
2005 represent the height of legislative perfection. Rather, Congress can
achieve President Obama's goal while still maintaining state authority in
electricity regulation. A few statistics from 2009 highlight the challenges
31 Id. at 22 fig. 11-2. There are currently 338 GW of coal generation capacity. U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., Existing Capacity By Energy Source (Apr. 2011),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epatlp2.html. If new EPA regulations force
the closure of all of the oldest coal power plants, for example all plants that began
operation prior to 1960, and no new coal power plants are built, coal capacity will be
approximately 290 GW, based on EIA data, available at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/images/2011.06.16/vintagecapbar.png (last visited
Aug. 30, 2011).
312 Trisko, supra note 293, at 995.
313 EIA Sulfur Scrubber Chart, supra note 296.
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and disparities among states, providing another rationale for allowing
states to choose their own methods of achieving a federal goal:3 14
* 36 states generated more than 20% of their electricity from coal,
thus currently falling short of Obama's goal;
* 22 states generated more than 50% of their electricity from coal;
* The top 5 states generated 32% of all coal electricity in the U.S.;
* The top 10 states generated 52% of all coal electricity;
* The states without any RPS or AEPS consumed 36% of all
electricity and generated 40% of all coal electricity.
These statistics illustrate that coal is currently widespread but
concentrated in a handful of states. The burden to reduce the amount of
coal generation will fall disproportionately on those states that currently
generate most of their electricity from coal. But these statistics give an
incomplete picture. Electricity markets are interstate, and some large coal
electricity producers export much of their power to nearby states.
Pennsylvania, the fourth largest producer of coal electricity, participates in
the PJM market 15 and exports more than one-third of the electricity it
produces. 3 West Virginia, the ninth largest producer of coal electricity
and also a participant in the PJM market, exports more than half of its coal
power.317
A threshold question for any new federal legislation is whether it
will be aimed at utilities, state regulators, or regional organizations. RPS
statutes typically set requirements for distribution companies, which sell
power to end-use customers, to procure power from renewable generation.
314 The following statistics were derived from U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Electric Power
Monthly, tbls. 1.6.B, 1.7.B, and 5.4.B (Mar. 2010),
http://www.eia.gov/ftproot/electricity/epm/02261003.pdf [hereinafter EPM March 2010].315 "PJM Interconnection is a regional transmission organization (RTO) that coordinates
the movement of wholesale electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia." PJM
INTERCONNECTION, WHO WE ARE, http://pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx (last
visited Aug. 30, 2011).
"' See EPM March 2010, supra note 314.317 id.
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Federal electricity legislation, such as PURPA, set requirements for both
utilities and state commissions. 3 18 On the other hand, the Clean Air Act,
the primary piece of environmental legislation that could be used to shut
down or clean up coal power plants, regulates individual sources, requires
states to implement goals and targets regional control areas.3 19 Given the
growing prominence of RTOs, new legislation or FERC regulations could
target regional electricity organizations. Meeting the Obama
Administration's goal could conceivably include several different
regulatory systems working along different jurisdictional lines, and such
complexity could be replicated at both federal and state levels. Such a
convoluted approach may be difficult to untangle, locking the electricity
sector into various overlapping regulatory systems that may be politically
difficult to undo. Given the uncertainty of the technological and economic
development of the electricity industry in moving to a lower carbon
footprint, a less tangled and more flexible regulatory approach may be
better suited to adapt and meet the challenges of reform.
Congress should therefore set a broad goal and let states determine
the best courses of action for meeting that goal. Requiring each state or
every utility to meet the 80% goal by 2035 will result in costly, and
perhaps unrealistic, shifts in electricity production for a handful of states.
One option is to mandate that all states or all utilities gradually reduce the
amount of electricity generated by dirty coal. Alternatively, rather than
directly targeting dirty coal, a less specific goal would mandate reductions
in emissions per megawatt-hour of electricity generated or consumed,
giving states and utilities the flexibility to choose from among all
generation options to reduce emissions. Setting C02/MWh goals would
give priority to zero-emissions technologies, such as nuclear, wind and
solar, over natural gas, which generates C02 emissions. Such a scheme
could obviate a national RPS as it would encourage and even reward
renewable generation without specific mandates for each state or utility.
Either mandate, reducing coal or reducing C02/MWh, would be
entirely consistent with a system of tradable allowances. A trading system
could allow states or utilities to offset each other's emissions through
m'See supra text accompanying notes 93-108.
m See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Understanding the Clean Air Act,
http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/understand.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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tradable credits. For example, under a C02 emissions allowance system,
if a utility in Massachusetts reduced its emissions below its target, it could
sell allowances to a utility in Ohio, allowing the Ohio utility to continue to
use more dirty coal. Under a Clean Energy Credit system, which would
be similar to how many states currently structure their RPS systems, a
utility would get a credit for each MWh of electricity sold from any source
other than dirty coal. At the end of the year, each utility would be
required to hold a certain number of credits based on the total amount of
electricity sold and the required percentage from non-coal mandated. The
system could include both carrots, such as additional tradable credits for
meeting renewable generation targets, and sticks, such as financial
penalties for failing to meet emissions targets.
A system of tradable allowances or credits could be administered
by states or regional organizations, as opposed to the federal government.
States or utilities could be given the option of joining a trading scheme
rather than being required to do so. Regional markets may better reflect
electricity industry positions and would therefore tie the allowance market
more closely to actual reductions of carbon emissions. A larger national
market seems more likely to attract a range of investors from outside of
the industry who have no stake in its future and are more likely to
prioritize quick profits from allowance trading over long-term industry
stability. The owners of electricity infrastructure are also profit-seeking
corporations, 3 2 0 but with billions of dollars invested in long-term assets,
such as power plants and transmission lines, they seem less likely to be
lured by the speculative profits available in smaller regional allowance or
credit markets.
States could be free to choose the means for achieving that federal
goal or go above and beyond that goal. The federal government could
provide backstop enforcement authority if states fail to make adequate
progress on their own. For example, funding from the federal government
could be tied to progress, with threats of funding reductions for failure to
320 Government-owned utilities generated 10.1% of U.S. electricity, cooperatives
generated 4.9%, and federal power marketers generated another 6.4%. The remaining
79.6% was generated by investor-owned utilities and non-utility generators, such as
independent power producers and industrial facilities. Am. Public Power Ass'n, U.S.
Electric Utility Industry Statistics (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf.
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meet targets and incentive payments, to be reinvested in clean energy
programs and efficiency, for states that are successful. As it already does
through the Clean Air Act, Congress could require states or utilities to
regularly submit implementation plans.32 1 These plans could be conducted
with federal government assistance, such as through funding grants, joint
studies, or technical assistance. The plans could serve as a guide against
which progress could be measured, could provide a basis for federal
regulators asserting jurisdiction, or could represent a shared understanding
between state regulators, utilities and the federal government of
developable "clean" resources and appropriate means for achieving the
national clean electricity goal. There is no doubt that some states will
resist any federal mandate to reducing dirty coal electricity, regardless of
its form. Some states will face steep costs, and if the federal government
is going to require states to incur those costs it ought to allow states to
allocate those costs as they see fit.
CONCLUSION: MAINTAINING THE FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE
An article in Business Week in 1947 stated that there are "highly
respected scientists who predict that within twenty years substantially all
central power will be drawn from atomic sources." 322 Seven years later,
the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission projected that "our
children will enjoy electrical energy [from fusion power] in their homes
that is too cheap to meter." 323 Writing in 1983 for a study published by
the Energy Project at Harvard Business School, a Harvard and Stanford
professor declared that, "it is relatively safe to predict that renewables by
the year 2000 will account for 10-30% of the nation's energy supply."324
321 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 110, State Implementation Plans for National Primary and
Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards (42 U.S.C. § 7410).
322 David Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, Practices, and Prospects 32 (Springer-
Verlag 2d ed. 2004) (citing Robert C. Williams & Philip L. Cantelon, What is the Atom's
Industrial Future, Bus. Wk., Mar. 9, 1947, at 21-22).323 Id
324 Modesto A. Maidique, Solar America, in Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project
at the Harvard Business School 231, 264 (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel Yergin, eds., 1980).
The article quotes several studies which project renewable energy's contribution at
between 7% and 27% by the year 2000. Id.
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In reality, nuclear energy never provided more than 21% of U.S.
electricity, fusion power32' does not exist, and only 6% of U.S. energy was
provided from renewables in 2004.326 Energy forecasts have "a manifest
,,327
record of failure. Predicating national electricity policy on precise
numerical outcomes328 based on one projection of the future of the
industry is a risky approach.
In the private sector, consolidation of an historically vertically-
integrated industry has been restrained by the SEC and FERC under the
329
authority of the PUHCA and the market power provisions of the FPA.
Since 1935, growth of individual utilities has been hindered by these laws
and regulations, helping to ensure that the nation's infrastructure is not
dominated by a handful of corporations. In the public sector, the power of
325 Bodanksy, supra note 322, at 35.
326 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Energy Consumption by Energy Source,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/trends/tablel.html (last visited Apr.
20, 2011).
327 Smil, supra note 255, at 121. Chapter 3, titled "Against Forecasting" cites numerous
examples of failed forecasts. Id. Smil argues that only two kinds of looking ahead are
worthwhile. Id. "The first kind consists of contingency scenarios preparing us for
foreseeable outcomes that may deviate substantially, even catastrophically, from standard
trend expectations or from consensus visions .... The second kind of forecasts
encompasses no-regret normative scenarios that should be prepared to guide our long-
term paths toward reconciliation of aspirations with biospheric imperatives." Id. at 121-
22.
328 See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §
721(e) (2009) (listing a specific number of greenhouse gas emissions allowances to be
issued each year from 2012 to 2050). The Act also includes means for regulators to issue
more or less allowances depending on actual emissions (§ 721(e)(2)), and polluters can
save allowances for future years (§ 725). While there is limited flexibility, the Act's cap-
and-trade system is premised on very precise projections by Congress of emissions that
are decades into the future. Many state RPS statutes include specific targets for annual
renewable energy generation. The key difference is that state legislation is much smaller
in scale. A state's RPS may only affect a few utilities, and while these precise numerical
projections may cause difficulties as the requirements continue to increase in the future,
state legislators and regulators can deal with those problems as they arise. In a national
system, some states may achieve goals without any difficulties while others may struggle.
Federal regulators will then be required to manage state-by-state crises, perhaps a task
better suited for state legislators and regulators.
329 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824b (requiring utilities to seek FERC approval for mergers and
acquisitions).
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regulators has been kept in check by the fact that there are fifty state
legislatures and commissions and a dozen regional organizations with
authority over the nation's electricity system. Such diversity can lead to
policy innovation, 330 and it also helps to protect against system-wide
collapse. Regulatory and market failures can still happen, as in California
in 2000,331 but further centralization increases the stakes of policymaking
and risks imposing a uniform regulatory system on a fragmented industry
with a range of current conditions.
If Congress passes legislation that sets specific nationwide goals or
significantly consolidates control over the industry, it will have to stay
engaged over the long-term. Course corrections seem inevitable given the
uncertainty inherent in energy markets. Congress, however, has
historically been disengaged from the industry. The few major pieces of
electricity legislation were only included as part of larger energy
legislation packages, and each was passed in the wake of prominent
foreign policy crises in the Middle East: the Oil Embargo of 1973, the Iraq
332war of 1991 and the Afghanistan and Iraq wars of 2001 and 2003. The
only other major piece of energy legislation during the last 40 years, the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, was passed while the U.S.
was still engaged in armed conflict and oil prices had climbed to $90 a
barrel, a 70% increase since the passage of the 2005 Act.3 33 Such crises
330 "One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by
allowing for the possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country."' Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
331 See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Soft Paths, Hard Choices: Environmental Lessons in the
Aftermath of California's Electric Deregulation Debacle." 23 Va. Envtl. L.J. 251 (2004-
05).
332 PURPA was passed in 1978, in the wake of the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74 and
continued rise in oil prices. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 was passed one year after
U.S.-led forces removed Sadaam Hussein from Kuwait. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
was passed while the U.S. was fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
3 The Energy Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15801 (2006), was passed on July 28, 2005 and
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 17001 (Supp. 2007),
was passed on December 18, 2007. Oil prices at the end of those weeks, according to
EIA data, were at $53.18 and $89.79 a barrel. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Petroleum &
Other Liquids,
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demanded a domestic political response. There is little reason to think
Congress has the political will to pass multiple pieces of electricity
legislation over the next decade. If Congress does enact a major bill in the
coming years that hands significant new authority to federal regulators, the
industry could be locked in for decades.
That is not to suggest that Congress has no role to play. Congress
has historically subsidized a wide range of energy resources, 334 and it
continues to support clean electricity. 335  In additional to financial
subsidies, Congress can also provide regulatory subsidies by removing or
limiting costly hurdles to developing clean electricity. For example, in
2010 the average age of a nuclear power plant in the U.S. was 30 years3 36
and nearly every nuclear plant came online before 1990.337 Nuclear
currently provides 20% of the country's electricity, twice as much as all
other non-carbon emitting sources combined, and reducing coal use
could prove a greater challenge if nuclear energy is declining as well.
http://www.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=WTOTWORLD&f=W (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011).
334 See, e.g., Robert H. Bezdek & Robert M. Wendling, A Half Century of US Federal
Government Energy Incentives: Value, Distribution, and Policy Implications, 27 Int. J.
Global Energy Issues 42, 42 (2007), available at http://www.misi-
net.com/publications/IJGEI-V27N 1 -07.pdf (calculating that energy subsidies "over the
past 50 years" from the federal government total $644 billion). Oil received the most
with $302 billion, followed by natural gas ($87.1), coal ($80.9), hydropower ($72.6),
nuclear ($63.4), renewables ($32.6), and geothermal ($5.7). Id. at 43. The authors'
calculations include: research and development, federal regulation and mandates,
taxation, disbursements, government services, and direct federal government involvement
in the marketplace. Id.
33s See, e.g., Adenike Adeyeye et al., Estimating U.S. Government Subsidies to Energy
Sources: 2002-2008, 3 (2009), available at
http://www.elistore.org/reportsdetail.asp?ID= 11358 (estimating federal government
subsidies for fossil fuels to be $72.4 billion during the 7 year period while renewables
received 28.9 billion in subsidies).
336 See 2009 Generator Report, supra note 123.
337 See id. Of the 104 nuclear power plants in the U.S., five began operations after 1989.
No new nuclear reactors have come online since 1996.
338 See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Review, Electricity Overview, tbl. 8.2c,
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/datalannual/txt/ptb0802c.html (last visited Aug. 30,
2011).
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Although public support for nuclear energy fell339 after the disaster at
Japan's Fukushima nuclear facility, 340 the Obama Administration has
continued to support the development of nuclear power.34 ' Congress
could take steps to support the ensure the continued viability of nuclear
power, such as creating fast-track environmental and licensing reviews
and take other steps to ensure the future viability of nuclear power.342
Similarly, the federal government could enable faster and simpler
3 In 2001, Gallup claimed that Americans' support of nuclear power reached an all-time
high. A poll conducted in March 2010 found that 62% of Americans "favor the use of
nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity for the U.S." U.S. Support for
Nuclear Power Climbs to New High of 62%, Gallup, Mar. 22, 2010,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 2 6 8 2 7 /support-nuclear-power-climbs-new-high.aspx (last
visited August 10, 2011). According to a Gallup poll conducted March 25-27, 2011, two
weeks after the Fukushima disaster, 46% of Americans said nuclear power "is necessary"
while 48% said the dangers are "too great." Majority ofAmericans Say Nuclear Power
Plants in US. are Safe, Gallup, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/l 4 6 9 3 9/majority-americans-say-nuclear-power-plants-
safe.aspx (last visited August 10, 2011).340 On March 11, 2011, an earthquake, measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale, struck off the
northeast coast of Japan. The earthquake and resulting tsunami led to a "massive
explosion" at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant the next day. Japan's
Megaquake: What We Know, New Scientist, Mar. 12, 2011,
http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/shortsharpscience/2011/03/powerful-japan-quake-
sparks-ts.html (last visited August 10, 2011). The explosion precipitated a weeks-long
crisis as international teams of experts attempted to contain the release of nuclear
materials. See Int'l Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log,
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/tsunamiupdate01.html (last visited August 10,2011). Japan's government later confirmed that three reactors experienced a "full
meltdown." 3 Nuclear Reactors Melted Down After Quake, Japan Confirms, CNN Jun. 7,
2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/06/06/japan.nuclear.meltdown/index.html?i
ref=NSI (last visited August 10, 2011).
341 Kathleen Hennessy, Energy Secretary Chu Says Obama Administration Remains
Committed to Nuclear Power, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/20 11/mar/1 5/news/sc-dc-chu-nuclear-energy-20110316
342See Mass Inst. of Tech., Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power 19 (2009),
http://web.mit.edulnuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf (concluding that "the
current assistance program put into place by the 2005 EPACT has not yet been effective
and needs to be improved. The sober warning is that if more is not done, nuclear power
will diminish as a practical and timely option for deployment at a scale that would
constitute a material contribution to climate change risk mitigation.").
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permitting of offshore wind and renewable generation projects on federal
land. As many as eleven federal agencies and fifteen statutes may
currently be implicated in the permitting process for offshore wind.3 43 The
Department of Interior ("DOI") has already begun the process of
simplifying permitting of projects on federal land on its own initiative.
Other agencies could grant unique treatment for clean electricity projects,
and Congress could enact a range of exemptions and simplifications.
EPA, DOI, DOE and others could continue to collaborate on studies that
will open large areas of the country for development of clean electricity
infrastructure. Congress could also require states to "consider" removing
regulatory impediments to the development of clean electricity that are
rooted in restrictive public utility laws.
343 Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Wind, & Water Power Program,
U.S. Dep't of Energy & Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement,
U.S. Dep't of the Interior, A National Offshore Wind Strategy: Creating an Offshore
Wind Energy Industry in the United States 11-12 tbl. 2 (2011),
http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/national-offshore-wind-strategy.pdf.
The eleven agencies are: Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement (Dept. of Interior), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EPA, Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Park Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Department of
Defense, U.S. Coast Guard, and FERC. Id. The statutes are: National Environmental
Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act, National Marine Sanctuaries Act, Coastal Zone Management Act,
National Historic Preservation Act, Federal Aviation Act, Federal Power Act, Ports and
Waterways Safety Act, Rivers and Harbors Act, Outer Continental Lands Act, Clean
Water Act, and Clean Air Act. Id.
3 See id at 13 (describing efforts by the Department of Interior to streamline the
permitting process for offshore wind); see also U.S. Dep't of Interior, Bureau of Land
Management, New Energy for America,
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/renewable_energy.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2011) (saying that "The U.S. Department of the Interior and the BLM are working with
local communities, state regulators, industry, and other federal agencies in building a
clean energy future by providing sites for environmentally sound development of
renewable energy on public lands.").
345 See, e.g., In the Matter of a Declaratory Order Regarding Third-Party Arrangements
for Renewable Energy Generation, No. 09-00217-UT (Dec. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.nmprc.state.nm.us/commissioners/pdf/Third%20Party%200rder.pdf
(ordering that "a third party developer that owns renewable generation equipment that is
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Congress has historically let states lead, generally requiring that
states "consider" a federal approach only after most had already adopted
it.346 In both transmission siting and clean electricity generation, many
states have made legislative and regulatory reforms to enable the
construction of new infrastructure. The key task for the federal
government is to articulate a goal that motivates further reform at the state
level. Congress has yet to do that. But if it does pass electricity
legislation it should recognize that there are many potential paths to
achieving its goal. Regulatory indeterminacy is a call to let states allocate
the costs of meeting a national goal to match their current situations and
long-term priorities. Deferring to states and granting them flexibility will
allow for a variety of approaches. Such policy diversity will enable
innovation and dampen the effects of mistakes and market failures.
installed on a customer's premises, pursuant to a long term contract with the customer to
supply a portion of that customer's electricity use, payments for which are based on a
kilowatt-hour charge, is not a public utility subject to regulation by the Commission.");
see also 220 Mass. Code Regs. 18.09(5) (2010) ("[n]othing in [the net metering
regulation] 220 CMR 18.00 is intended in any way to limit eligibility for Net Metering
services based upon a third party ownership or financing agreement related to a Net
Metering facility, where Net Metering services would otherwise be available.").
According to the Department of Public Utilities, this clause was added to the regulations
"[t]o ensure that our final regulations do not impede the development of third-party
ownership or financing arrangements." Mass. Dep't of Pub. Utilities, Order Adopting
Final Regulations, D.P.U. 08-75-A (Jun. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.env.state.ma.us/dpu/docs/gas/08-75/62609dpuord.pdf Each of these state
commission orders is an example of the commission providing an exemption for third-
party financing arrangements of small-scale renewable energy generation facilities on a
customer's premises. But see Arizona Corp. Comm'n, In the Matter of the Application of
Solar City Corp. For a Determination that When It Provides Solar Service to Arizona
Schools, Governments, and Non-Profit Entities It Is Not Acting as a Public Service
Corporation Pursuant to Art. 15, Section 2 of the Ariz. Constitution, No. E-20690A-09-
0346 (Jul. 12, 2010), available at
http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000114068.pdf (where Arizona regulators
found that under a third-party financing arrangement, the third-party owner of solar
panels would not be regulated as a public utility when entering into a Solar Services
Agreement with schools, government entities, and non-profits, but did not decide whether
it would be considered a public utility when dealing with commercial and residential
customers).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 110-112, 154-157.
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Congress should remain cautious as it inevitably continues to expand its
jurisdiction and influence over the electricity industry.
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